Pan v. IOC Realty Specialist, Inc.

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Pan v. IOC Realty Specialist, Inc.

Case Number
S-17-0815
Call Date
August 31, 2018
Case Time
9:00 AM
Court Number
Douglas
Case Location
Lincoln
Case Summary

S-17-0815 Samuel Pan dba U.S. World Daycare Center v. IOC Realty Specialist Inc. and Bernard M. Tompkins (Appellants)

District Court of Douglas County, Hon. Gregory M. Schatz

Civil: Replevin and money damages under the Disposition of Personal Property Landlord and Tenant Act

Attorneys: Willow T. Head --- John C. Chatelain (Chatelain & Maynard) (Appellants)

Proceedings below:  The district court found that the Appellee was the rightful owner of the personal property at issue and that the Appellants were liable to the plaintiff for $ 20,000 for the wrongful retention of property, which damages are authorized by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 69-2312.

Issues: The District Court erred in 1) failing to find that Mary Chol, Ci Nuer Ben America and the Kleinschmits, d/b/a Millard Electronics were indispensable parties to the determination of

Appellee’s case upon Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 2) failing to find that Mary Chol. Ci Nuer Ben America and the Kleinschmits, d/b/a Millard Electronics were indispensable parties to the determination of Appellee’s case at Trial, 3) receiving and relying upon inadmissible hearsay of the contents of written affidavits regarding elements of the burden of proof regarding title to property in Appellee’s case without the proper foundation for the statements and without Appellants having an opportunity to cross-examine the source of the statements, 4) finding Appellee had met his burden of proof regarding ownership and right to possession to the subject personal property contrary to allegations in Appellee's affidavit, pleadings and the evidence received at trial for purposes of a replevin Action, 5) entering a money judgment against Appellants when the proper remedy in replevin is the return of the property to the owner or one with right to possession, 6) finding Appellee met his burden of proof as to fair market valuation of the subject property and damages, 7) the valuation of the subject property and award of damages, including attorney fees, 8) finding that the Disposition of Personal Property Landlord Tenant Act applied to Appellee's Commercial Lease, 9) finding that Appellants were in violation of the Disposition of Personal Property Landlord Tenant Act, 10) awarding damages and attorney fees against Appellants when the Appellee's lessors, for purposes of the Disposition of Personal Property Landlord Tenant Act, were Leon Kleinschmit and/or Mary Kleinschmit and not the Appellants, 11) denying Appellant's claim for storage costs for holding the subject personal property, 12) entering a judgment that was not supported by sufficient evidence, and 13) entering a judgment that was contrary to law.

 

Schedule Code
SC