

NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT COMMISSION ON UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW

Unauthorized Practice of Law (“UPL”) Update

UPL COMMISSION

- 6 lawyers one from each Judicial district
- 3 lay members
- Counsel on UPL (“CUPL”)
 - Shela Shanks

UPL REGULATION INTENT

“[t]he privilege of representing others . . . is regulated by law for the protection of the public, to ensure that those who provide legal services to others are qualified to do so by education, training, and experience and that they are held accountable for errors, misrepresentations, and unethical practices.”

NEB. CT. R. §3-1003

GENERAL PROHIBITION

No nonlawyer shall engage in the practice of law in Nebraska or in any manner represent that such nonlawyer is authorized or qualified to practice law in Nebraska except as may be authorized by published opinion or court rule.

§ 3 – 1002(A)

The term “nonlawyer” means any person not duly licensed or otherwise authorized to practice law in the State of Nebraska.

Neb. Ct. R. § 3-1001. General definition.

The “practice of law,” or “to practice law,” is the application of legal principles and judgment with regard to the circumstances or objectives of another entity or person which require the knowledge, judgment, and skill of a person trained as a lawyer.

Neb. Ct. R. § 3-1001

“Giving advice. . . to another. . . as to legal rights. . . relationship of trust or reliance . . .”

“Selection, drafting, completion, for another. . . documents. . . Affect legal rights. . .”

“Representation of another. . . formal administrative adjudicative proceeding. . . legal pleadings. . . record. . . judicial review”

“Negotiation of legal rights. . . behalf of another. . .”

“Holding oneself out to another as being entitled to practice law. . .”

ROLE OF JUDGES IN ENFORCING THE UPL RULES

**First National Bank v. Phillips – Motion to
Strike UPL filings granted**

**State of Nebraska v. Edmonds – Judge Removed
UPL filings from the Record**

**Waite v. Regional West et. Al. – Judge issued a
permanent injunction enjoining a party who
previously committed UPL from further filings.**

**Steinhausen v. HomeServices of Nebraska-
Supreme Court held that a case filed as a result
of UPL is a nullity subject to dismissal.**

“

**PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
STRIKE AND DISMISS...IS
GRANTED..ALL PLEADINGS
FILED BY...[PERSON
COMMITTING UPL] ARE
STRICKEN FROM THE
RECORD...**

”

First National Bank of Gordon, Nebraska v. Phillips

Sheridan County District Court

CI 15-32

“

**THE CLERK IS DIRECTED TO
REMOVE THOSE [UPL] FILINGS
FROM THE COURT FILE...**

”

**State of Nebraska v. Edmonds
Saunders County District Court
CR12-109**

“

**THIS COURT WILL..[ENTER] AN
INJUNCTION PERMANENTLY
BARRING...THE
PLAINTIFF...FROM FILING ANY
NEW CASE...**

”

Waite v. Regional West Medical Center, et. Al.

Scottsbluff County District Court

CI13-109

“ A NONATTORNEY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE IS ENGAGED IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW IF HE PERSONALLY BRINGS A WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION FOR MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE ON BEHALF OF THE DECEASED’S ESTATE. ”

Waite v. Carpenter, 1 Neb. App. 321, 496 N.W.2nd 1 (1992)

“

**A LEGAL PROCEEDING IN
WHICH A PARTY IS
REPRESENTED BY A PERSON
NOT ADMITTED TO PRACTICE
LAW IS A NULLITY AND IS
SUBJECT TO DISMISSAL.**

”

Steinhausen v. Homeservices of Neb., 289 Neb. 927 (2015)

“

**...A LICENSED MEMBER OF
THE NEBRASKA BAR MUST
REPRESENT AN LLC IN THE
COURTS OF THIS STATE.**

”

Steinhausen v. Homeservices of Neb., 289 Neb. 927 (2015)

UPL ADVISORY OPINIONS

- **Advisory Opinion 2015-02 - Powers of Attorney**
- **Advisory Opinion 2015-01 - Mediator Role in Developing a Parenting Plan**
- **Advisory Opinion 2013-002 - Assignee with a contingency fee arrangement acting as a pro se litigant to collect on a judgment**
- **Advisory Opinion 2013-001 - Child Support Liens**
- **Advisory Opinion 2012-001 - Bill of Sale**
- **Advisory Opinion 2010-001 - Title Insurance**
- **Advisory Opinion 2010-002 - Fair Housing**

“

**POWER OF ATTORNEY DOES
NOT GRANT AUTHORITY TO
PRACTICE LAW**

”

Advisory Opinion 02-2105

**A power of attorney may not supersede the authority of the Supreme Court,
nor is the power to act as an attorney conferred under the Uniform Power of
Attorney Act.**

CACH, LLC V. DENOURIE, DOUGLAS CO. CT., CI 12-7579

“[a] properly executed Power of Attorney allows an agent to do a number of activities on behalf of the principal. . . The agent can assert claims and litigation on behalf of the principal; however this section does not allow a non-licensed attorney to represent a third party.”

IT IS UPL TO ENFORCE A JUDGMENT ON A PRO SE BASIS AS AN ASSIGNEE OF A JUDGMENT WHEN THE JUDGMENT IS PURCHASED ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS

“When an individual purchases a judgment in a contingency fee arrangement and seeks to enforce that judgment on a *pro se* basis instead of hiring a lawyer, the purchaser is not representing only himself or herself but also is necessarily representing the seller of that judgment.”
Neb. Ct. R. §3-1001.

**MAY TITLE
COMPANIES
DRAFT CHILD
SUPPORT
RELEASE
FORMS?**

- **No. No exception applies because the release will affect the judgment. § 3-1004 A(5). Drafting child support release forms by a title company is UPL.**

**A REAL ESTATE
AGENT OR TITLE
COMPANY MAY
PROVIDE A
BLANK BILL OF
SALE FORM**

**“In closing a real estate sale,
licensed real estate brokers and title
insurance companies and their
licensed agents may prepare deeds,
releases which do not affect
judgment liens, deeds of
reconveyance, title affidavits, closing
statements, and related documents.”**

Neb. Ct. R. 3-1004 (A) (5)

OTHER PERMISSABLE ACTIVITIES BY TITLE INSURANCE COMPANIES

- **Provide a blank purchase agreement form**
- **Advise parties where to obtain a form**
- **Prepare the deeds**
- **Prepare form affidavits**

**TITLE INSURANCE
COMPANIES MAY NOT
PROVIDE ADVICE TO
CLIENTS ON THE LEGAL
EFFECT OR VALIDITY OF
THE DOCUMENTS, WHICH
DOCUMENTS TO CHOOSE
FOR A PARTICULAR
TRANSACTION OR THE
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATION
OF THE PARTIES UNDER THE
DOCUMENTS**

FAIR HOUSING HEARINGS

- **Fair Housing Center of Nebraska's work with complainant's during the initial stages of the administrative process and investigation is not UPL**
- **Neb. Ct. R. §3-1001 (C) allows representation of the type that is provided by the Fair Housing Center.**
- **Advisory Opinion 2010-002**

MEDIATOR ROLE IN DEVELOPING A PARENTING PLAN

Advisory Opinion 01-2015

LIMITED LICENSE LEGAL TECHNICIANS (LLLT)

- **New category of legal practitioner**
- **Non lawyers permitted by rule to practice law on a limited basis in specific areas of law**
- **Washington Supreme Court adopted a rule permitting LLLTs in the area of domestic relations.**
- **Billed as an access to justice solution but one fraught with difficult and concerning problems.**
- **As lawyers, we will need to assist in the solution to the access to justice problem. If we do not assist, a “solution” will likely be set in place for us.**

UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF IMMIGRATION LAW – “UPIIL”

64-105.03 NOTARY PUBLIC; UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW; PROHIBITED.

“A Notary Public who is not an attorney may not use the term notario publico or any equivalent non-English term in any business card, advertisement, notice, or sign.”

“A NOTARY PUBLIC WHO IS NOT AN ATTORNEY AND WHO ADVERTISES NOTARIAL SERVICES IN A LANGUAGE OTHER THAN ENGLISH SHALL INCLUDE IN ANY ADVERTISEMENT, NOTICE, LETTERHEAD, OR SIGN A STATEMENT PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED IN THE SAME LANGUAGE AS FOLLOWS: "I AM NOT AN ATTORNEY AND HAVE NO AUTHORITY TO GIVE ADVICE ON IMMIGRATION OR OTHER LEGAL MATTERS".” **NEB. REV. ST. 64-105.03**

**ONLY CERTAIN NON-LAWYERS WHO
MEET SPECIFIC CONDITIONS MAY
ASSIST WITH IMMIGRATION FORMS.**

“LAW STUDENTS AND RECENT LAW SCHOOL GRADUATES NOT YET ADMITTED TO THE BAR”

“REPUTABLE INDIVIDUALS”

“ACCREDITED REPRESENTATIVES”

“ACCREDITED OFFICIALS”

ATTORNEYS LICENSED IN OTHER COUNTRIES AND

“PERSONS FORMERLY AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE”

8 C.F.R. 292.1(2)-(6)

Jurisdiction over all complaints alleging UPL (Neb. Ct. R. §3-1012(A))

UPL Commission may:

- Investigate
- Issue “Cease and desist”
- Consent agreement
- Litigate

AUTHORITY AND FUNCTIONS

APPENDIX A (COMPLAINT FORM)

NEBRASKA COMMISSION ON UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
3806 NORMAL BLVD.
LINCOLN, NE 68506-5420

DATE _____

<p>1. Please give us information so we can contact you.</p> <p>Name _____</p> <p>Address _____</p> <p>City, State Zip _____</p> <p>Home Phone _____</p> <p>Cell Phone _____</p> <p>Other Phone _____</p> <p>Email _____</p>	<p>2. Who do you believe has engaged in the Unauthorized Practice of Law?</p> <p>Name _____</p> <p>Address _____</p> <p>City, State Zip _____</p> <p>Home Phone _____</p> <p>Cell Phone _____</p> <p>Other Phone _____</p> <p>Email _____</p>
<p>3. What did they do? What is your specific complaint?</p> <p>Be specific. Give actual dates and full addresses of all places that are important to your complaint. Tell what kind of contact you had with the person, whether it was a phone call, personal meeting, emails, letters, or something else. Attach copies of any papers, letters, receipts, checks, contracts, advertisements, or anything else that applies to this complaint. Supporting documents may be scanned and emailed to shela.shanks@nebraska.gov or mailed to the address above. If you need additional space, please use the supplement pages at the end of this form.</p> <p>_____</p>	

UPL COMPLAINT FORM

[HTTPS://SUPREMECOURT.NEBRASKA.GOV](https://supremecourt.nebraska.gov)

SEARCH UPL COMPLAINT FORM

OR [HTTP://1.U.S.A.GOV/1VVPRTD](http://1.usa.gov/1VVPRTD)

CIVIL INJUNCTIONS

2014

State of Nebraska ex rel. Commission on Unauthorized Practice of Law v. Hansen (286 Neb. 69)

2012

State of Nebraska ex rel. Commission on Unauthorized Practice of Law v. Billy Roy Tyler (283 Neb. 736)

2011

State of Nebraska ex rel. Commission on Unauthorized Practice of Law v. M.A. Yah dba Parental Rights (281 Neb. 383)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SHERIDAN COUNTY, NEBRASKA

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF)	CASE NO. CI 15-32
GORDON, NEBRASKA,)	
)	MOTION TO STRIKE
Plaintiff,)	AND DISMISS;
)	APPLICATION FOR AN
v.)	ORDER TO ENJOIN
)	JOAQUIN MARIANO
MARVIN PHILLIPS)	DeMORETA-FOLCH
)	FROM PRACTICING LAW;
Defendant.)	MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S
)	FEEES

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, by and through it’s attorney of record, Jamian J. Simmons, and moves this Court for an order striking and dismissing documents filed in this case on May 4, 2015 by Joaquin Mariano DeMoreta-Folch. Pursuant to Neb.Ct.R. Pldg. §6-1112 (b), the pleading fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and it is a frivolous pleading pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. §25-824. Plaintiff also submits this as an application for an order to enjoin Joaquin Mariano DeMoreta-Folch from practicing law. In support thereof, Plaintiff states as follows:

I. Motion to Strike and Dismiss

1. The pleading filed on May 4, 2015 by Joaquin Mariano DeMoreta-Folch purports to be a “Criminal Complaint” which is filed in a civil case pending in the First National Bank of Gordon, Nebraska, Plaintiff vs. Marvin Phillips, Defendant, Sheridan County District Court CI15-32.

2. The submitted filing is signed by Joaquin Mariano DeMoreta-Folch who is not a party to this action and who is not an attorney authorized to practice law in the state of Nebraska.

3. Nebraska Court Rules of Pleadings and Civil Actions §6-1112(b)(6) require a

complaint or other pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Nothing about the “Criminal Complaint” filed on May 4, 2015 states a claim upon which relief can be granted and is therefore an improper pleading.

II. Application for Order Enjoining Joaquin Mariano DeMoreta-Folch from Practicing Law

4. Joaquin Mariano DeMoreta-Folch holds himself out to be the “Administrator in the Statewide Common Law Grand Jury” for the states of Florida and Nebraska. He is not an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Nebraska.

5. The laws of the State of Nebraska do not recognize the jurisdiction or authority of a “Statewide Common Law Grand Jury,” and as such this type of court proceeding does not exist under the laws of this state. Further, a Statewide Common Law Grand Jury for the State of Florida would have no application in the state of Nebraska.

6. The Common Law Grand Jury Criminal Complaint filed herein on May 4, 2015 purports to make assertions of fact regarding the case in controversy on behalf of Defendant, Marvin Phillips. The filed document bears the physical address of Defendant, Marvin Phillips, and Defendant, Marvin Phillips, appeared with Joaquin Mariano DeMoreta-Folch in the office of the Sheridan County District Court Clerk on May 4, 2015 when the document was filed.

7. The pleadings filed by Joaquin Mariano DeMoreta-Folch were filed on behalf of Marvin Phillips, Defendant and/or in his interests.

8. The representation of another person’s interest requires a license to practice law pursuant to Neb.Ct.R. Pldg. §3-101, et seq.

III. Pleading Constitutes Frivolous Action

9. The pleading filed by Joaquin Mariano DeMoreta-Folch and Defendant on May 4, 2015 constitutes a frivolous pleading and is made in bad faith.

10. Neb.Rev.Stat. §85-824 et seq. holds that pleadings deemed frivolous and made in bad faith may be stricken and that reasonable attorney's fees or costs may be assessed.

11. The pleading filed by Defendant and by Joaquin Mariano DeMoreta-Folch is not a proper responsive pleading, is not filed by an attorney licensed to practice law and serves no purpose beyond delay or harassment.

WHEREFORE Plaintiff requests the Court strike and dismiss the pleading filed by Joaquin Mariano DeMoreta-Folch on May 4, 2015; that the Court award attorney's fees and costs for Plaintiff's attorney; for an order enjoining Joaquin Mariano DeMoreta-Folch from the unauthorized practice of law in the state of Nebraska; and for any other relief that the Court finds equitable under the law.

DATED: May 12, 2015.

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF
GORDON, NEBRASKA, Plaintiff

By: 

Jamian J. Simmons, NSBA #23475
SMITH, KING & SIMMONS, P.C.
P.O. Box 302
Gordon, NE 69343-0302
Telephone: 308-282-0690
Facsimile: 308-282-1029

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE


The undersigned certifies that he mailed a true copy of the foregoing on:

Marvin Phillips
6445 210th Lane
Gordon, NE 69343

by U.S. mail, postage prepaid on May 12, 2015, and by electronic transmission to:

Joaquin Mariano DeMoreta-Folch
Grandjurysheridan.ne@gmail.com

on May 12, 2015.



Jamian J. Simmons

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that on Thursday, May 14, 2015 I provided a true and correct copy of the Motion-Strike to the following:

Phillips,Marvin, service method: First Class Mail

Signature: /s/ Jamian J. Simmons (Bar Number: 23475)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SHERIDAN COUNTY, NEBRASKA

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF)
 GORDON, NEBRASKA,)
)
 Plaintiff,)
)
 v.)
)
 MARVIN PHILLIPS)
)
 Defendant.)

CASE NO. CI 15-32

JOURNAL ENTRY
AND ORDER

FILED
 5-15-15
 CAROL STOUJEEF
 CLERK DISTRICT COURT
 SHERIDAN COUNTY
 NEBRASKA

This matter came on for hearing on this 27th day of May, 2015, for review of the Motion to Strike and Dismiss; Application for an Order to Enjoin Joaquin Mariano DeMoreta-Folch from Practicing Law; Motion for Attorney’s Fees. The Plaintiff appeared by their attorney of record, Jamian J. Simmons. The Defendant, Marvin Phillips, appeared but was not represented by counsel.

Ms. Simmons offered Exhibit 1, a copy of all pleadings filed by Joaquin Mariano DeMoreta-Folch on May 4, 2015. Finding the Defendant had no objection to Exhibit 1, Exhibit 1 was received. Ms. Simmons did not offer evidence on her Motion for Attorney’s Fees and that part of the Motion was not considered. Ms. Simmons made arguments on the Motion to Strike and Dismiss and Application to Enjoin Joaquin Mariano DeMoreta-Folch from Practicing Law. Mr. Phillips made comments on his own behalf.

Upon review of the evidence and arguments submitted, the Court finds and orders as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike and Dismiss pleadings filed by Joaquin Mariano DeMoreta-Folch is granted and it is hereby ordered that all pleadings filed by Joaquin Mariano DeMoreta-Folch on May 4, 2015 and May 26, 2015 are stricken from the record herein and are hereby dismissed.




2. The Court further enters an order enjoining Joaquin Mariano DeMoreta-Folch from entering an appearance on another individual's behalf or filing any pleading in this Court and is enjoined from the practice of law in this Court.

3. The Court further orders that a copy of this Journal Entry and Order shall be sent to the Nebraska Commission for the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 3806 Normal Blvd., Lincoln, Nebraska 68506-5420.

IT IS THEREFORE SO ORDERED.

BY THE COURT:



TRAVIS P. O'GORMAN
DISTRICT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that she mailed a true copy of the foregoing to:

Marvin Phillips
6445 210th Lane
Gordon, NE 69343

Nebraska Commission for the Unauthorized Practice of Law
3806 Normal Blvd.
Lincoln, NE 68506-5420

by U.S. mail, postage prepaid on May 28, 2015.



Jamian J. Simmons, NSBA #23475
SMITH, KING & SIMMONS, P.C.
P.O. Box 302
Gordon, NE 69343-0302
Telephone: 308-282-0690
Facsimile: 308-282-1029

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, certify that on June 1, 2015, I served a copy of the foregoing document upon the following persons at the addresses given, by mailing by United States Mail, postage prepaid, or via E-mail:

Marvin Phillips
6445 210th Lane
Gordon, NE 69343

Jamian J Simmons
jamians@gpcom.net



Date: June 1, 2015

BY THE COURT:

Carol Stauffer
CLERK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAUNDERS COUNTY, NEBRASKA

STATE OF NEBRASKA,
Plaintiff,
Vs.

GILBERT EDMONDS,
Defendant.

CR 12-109

ORDER

FILED BY
CLERK OF THE DIST. COURT
2015 JUL 27 PM 3:19
SAUNDERS COUNTY
NEBRASKA

This matter came on for hearing on July 27, 2015. There are a number of motions pending before the court. Defendant appeared with Mr. Klein and Mr. Dobesh. The State appeared by Demi Herman, Deputy County Attorney.

Having reviewed all matters properly before it, the court now makes the following rulings.

1. **Unauthorized filings.** The Defendant's mother Melinda Briggs filed various motions before the court, under an alleged "power of attorney." She is not an attorney and at the time these matters were filed, defendant was represented by counsel. At the hearing the court recited into the record, the image numbers of the improperly filed documents. Those numbers appear, highlighted in pink, on the JUSTICE system printout appended hereto. The clerk is directed to remove those filings from the court file and to maintain the same in a separate and secure place pending final resolution of this matter.
2. **Withdrawal of counsel.** The Saunders County Public Defender is granted leave to withdraw in this matter. The Commission for Public Advocacy is appointed.
3. **Motion for Return of Transcript Fee.** The court file reflects that Defendant's mother requested a transcript of the trial during the time that Defendant has been awaiting sentencing. She is not entitled to reimbursement from the county and this motion is overruled without hearing.
4. **Motion for Post Conviction Relief and to Vacate Sentence.** Defendant has not been sentenced and these motions are premature and are overruled.

Defendant has made various motions which essentially request that he receive a new trial. **Motions for New Trial are set for September 14, 2015 at 1PM.** One half hour is allowed.

SO ORDERED.


Defendant shall be held w/o bond
[Signature]



000087415D06

Dated and signed this 27th day of July, 2015.

BY THE COURT:



MARY C. GILBRIDE, DISTRICT JUDGE

PC: County Attorney
Public Defendant
Commission for Public Advocacy

Case ID CR 12 109 OR Image ID _____
Caption State v. Gilbert C Edmonds
Select Date Range From _____ To _____

Date Filed 11 29 2012
Chronological Sort (Y/N)

To display an image, place the cursor on an Image ID below and press Enter.

Image ID	Sealed	Action Date	Act No	Action
000086759D06	N	07 15 2015	218	Journal Entry
000086795D06	N	07 13 2015	219	Affidavit
000086796D06	N	07 13 2015	220	Motion Filed
000086797D06	N	07 13 2015	222	Motion Filed
000086798D06	N	07 13 2015	224	Motion Filed
000086799D06	N	07 13 2015	226	Motion Filed of Venue
000086800D06	N	07 13 2015	227	Motion Filed
000086801D06	N	07 13 2015	229	Motion Filed
000087075D06	N	07 10 2015	215	Order
N1518042ED06	N	06 29 2015	214	Motion-Withdraw as Counsel <i>Tom</i>
000086434D06	N	06 12 2015	202	Motion Filed

Gilbert

+

F1=Help F3=Exit F5=Refresh F12=Cancel

Gilbert

Others Affidavits

Melinda as POA

Case ID CR 12 109 OR Image ID _____
Caption State v. Gilbert C Edmonds
Select Date Range From _____ To _____

Date Filed 11 29 2012
Chronological Sort (Y/N)

To display an image, place the cursor on an Image ID below and press Enter.

Image ID	Sealed	Action Date	Act No	Action
000086435D06	N	06 12 2015	204	Motion Filed
000086436D06	N	06 12 2015	206	Motion Filed
000086437D06	N	06 12 2015	208	Motion Filed
000086438D06	N	06 12 2015	210	Motion Filed
000086439D06	N	06 12 2015	212	Motion Filed
000085907D06	N	06 10 2015	201	Order
000086336D06	N	06 05 2015	193	Motion Filed
000086337D06	N	06 05 2015	195	Motion Filed
000086340D06	N	06 04 2015	197	App-Atty Fees/Reimburse Fees
000086341D06	N	06 03 2015	190	Affidavit
000086323D06	N	06 03 2015	191	Affidavit

F1=Help F3=Exit F5=Refresh F12=Cancel

Case ID CR 12 109 OR Image ID _____
Caption State v. Gilbert C Edmonds
Select Date Range From _____ To _____

Date Filed 11 29 2012
Chronological Sort (Y/N) _

To display an image, place the cursor on an Image ID below and press Enter.

Image ID	Sealed	Action Date	Act No	Action
000086322D06	N	06 03 2015	192	Affidavit
000086309D06	N	06 01 2015	185	Affidavit
000086310D06	N	06 01 2015	186	Motion Filed
000086311D06	N	06 01 2015	188	Motion Filed
000086275D06	N	05 29 2015	182	Journal Entry
000085822D06	N	05 27 2015	181	Motion-Withdraw as Counsel <i>Tom</i>
000086248D06	N	05 26 2015	177	Motion Filed <i>6/1/15</i>
000086254D06	N	05 26 2015	179	Affidavit <i>cert withdrawal</i>
000086255D06	N	05 26 2015	180	Affidavit <i>cert withdrawal</i>
000086276D06	N	05 26 2015	183	Motion Filed
000085627D06	N	05 05 2015	176	Order

+

F1=Help F3=Exit F5=Refresh F12=Cancel

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, certify that on July 27, 2015 , I served a copy of the foregoing document upon the following persons at the addresses given, by mailing by United States Mail, postage prepaid, or via E-mail:


Public Defender
hsklaw@wahooattorneys.com

Demetria W Herman
mlibal@co.saunders.ne.us

Date: July 27, 2015

BY THE COURT:

Patty McGraw
CLEK



LANCASTER COUNTY
2015 JAN 26 PM 1 31
CLERK OF THE
DISTRICT COURT

THE STATE OF NEBRASKA, ss.

I hereby certify that I have compared the foregoing copy of an opinion filed by this Court with the original on file in my office and that the same is a correct copy of the original.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused to be affixed the Seal of this Court, in the City of Lincoln.



Samuel A. ...
Clerk/Deputy Clerk

SUPREME COURT NO.	S-13-1103
TRIAL TRIBUNAL NO.	CI12-119
DATE OPINION FILED	January 23, 2015
DATE OPINION CERTIFIED	January 23, 2015

LANCASTER
2015 JAN 28
CLERK OF
DISTRICT COURT



001492473D02

OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NEBRASKA

Case Title

**MATTHEW M. STEINHAUSEN, DOING BUSINESS AS STEINHAUSEN
HOME INSPECTIONS LLC, APPELLANT,
V.
HOMESERVICES OF NEBRASKA, INC., ET AL., APPELLEES.**

Case Caption

STEINHAUSEN V. HOMESERVICES OF NEB.

Filed January 23, 2015. No. S-13-1103.

**Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: ROBERT R. OTTE, Judge.
Affirmed in part, and in part reversed and remanded with directions.**

Matthew M. Steinhausen, pro se.

**Shawn D. Renner, of Cline, Williams, Wright, Johnson & Oldfather, L.L.P., for
appellee Shelly J. Nitz.**

**Michael D. Reisbig and Brian D. Nolan, of Nolan, Olson & Stryker, P.C., L.L.O.,
for appellees HomeServices of Nebraska, Inc., and Woods Brothers Realty.**

STEINHAUSEN v. HOMESERVICES OF NEB.

Filed January 23, 2015. No. S-13-1103.

1. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will affirm a lower court's grant of summary judgment if the pleadings and admitted evidence show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from the facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

2. ____: ____. In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment was granted, and gives that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence.

3. Attorney and Client: Actions. A legal proceeding in which a party is represented by a person not admitted to practice law is a nullity and is subject to dismissal.

4. Attorneys at Law: Attorney and Client. A licensed member of the Nebraska bar must represent a limited liability company in the courts of this state.

5. Attorney and Client: Parties: Appeal and Error. When a layperson appeals both in his own behalf and on behalf of a business entity, an appellate court dismisses the appeal as to the entity but considers the merits of the appeal as to the errors assigned by the layperson in his own behalf.

6. Actions: Pleadings: Parties. The character in which one is a party to a suit, and the capacity in which a party sues, is determined from the allegations of the pleadings and not from the caption alone.

7. Courts: Actions: Parties: Complaints: Pleadings: Records. If the capacity in which a party sues is doubtful, a court may examine the complaint, the pleadings as a whole, and even the entire record.

8. Actions: Pleadings: Parties. When the pleadings show a cause of action by a person in his individual capacity, a court may reject words indicating representative capacity.

9. Libel and Slander: Negligence. A defamation claim has four elements: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party, (3) fault amounting to at least negligence on the part of the publisher, and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication.

10. Libel and Slander. A communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.

11. Libel and Slander: Proof. The threshold question in a defamation suit is whether a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the published statements imply a provably false factual assertion.

12. Constitutional Law: Libel and Slander. To distinguish fact from opinion in a defamation claim, courts apply a totality of the circumstances test. Relevant factors include (1) whether the general tenor of the entire work negates the impression that the defendant asserted an objective

fact, (2) whether the defendant used figurative or hyperbolic language, and (3) whether the statement is susceptible of being proved true or false.

13. **Actions: Libel and Slander.** Rhetorical hyperbole—language that, in context, is obviously understood as an exaggeration rather than as a statement of literal fact—is not actionable.

14. ____: _____. If a plaintiff asserts claims of both libel and false light invasion of privacy based on the same statement, the false light claim is subsumed within the defamation claim and is not separately actionable.

15. **Torts: Intent: Proof.** To succeed on a claim for tortious interference with a business relationship or expectancy, a plaintiff must prove (1) the existence of a valid business relationship or expectancy, (2) knowledge by the interferer of the relationship or expectancy, (3) an unjustified intentional act of interference on the part of the interferer, (4) proof that the interference caused the harm sustained, and (5) damage to the party whose relationship or expectancy was disrupted.

16. **Torts: Corporations.** Members of a limited liability company cannot, in their own behalf, maintain a claim for tortious interference with the business relationships or expectancies of the company.

17. **Trial: Evidence: Appeal and Error.** In a civil case, the admission or exclusion of evidence is not reversible error unless it unfairly prejudiced a substantial right of the complaining party.

18. ____: ____: _____. The exclusion of evidence is ordinarily not prejudicial where substantially similar evidence is admitted without objection.

HEAVICAN, C.J., CONNOLLY, STEPHAN, MCCORMACK, MILLER-LERMAN, and CASSEL, JJ.
CONNOLLY, J.

I. SUMMARY

Shelly J. Nitz is a real estate agent affiliated with HomeServices of Nebraska, Inc. (HomeServices). Matthew M. Steinhausen is a home inspector who inspected a house that one of Nitz' clients owned. More than 2 years after the inspection, Nitz sent an e-mail to HomeServices real estate agents and employees stating that Steinhausen was a "[t]otal idiot." Steinhausen, proceeding pro se, sued Nitz and HomeServices, alleging claims of libel, false light invasion of privacy, and tortious interference with a business relationship or expectancy. The district court sustained Nitz' and HomeServices' motions for summary judgment, reasoning that a qualified privilege protected the e-mail and that the evidence failed to show that Steinhausen had a business relationship or expectancy with Nitz or HomeServices. We affirm the court's judgment as it relates to the claims asserted by Steinhausen in his personal capacity. Because Steinhausen's attempt to also prosecute this action for a business entity is a nullity, we reverse, and remand with directions to vacate the judgment as it relates to claims brought for the entity.

II. BACKGROUND

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

HomeServices is a brokerage firm whose business includes real estate sales. HomeServices does business as HOME Real Estate and Woods Brothers Realty, both of which are trade names owned by HomeServices and "not corporate entities." Nitz is a real estate agent affiliated with HomeServices.

Steinhausen began performing home inspections in 1999. After operating the business as a sole proprietorship, Steinhausen formed Steinhausen Home Inspections LLC (SHI) in 2004. Steinhausen is the sole member of SHI and its registered agent. SHI's primary business is home inspections, but it also performs commercial property inspections and offers consulting services.

In 2008, Nitz represented the seller of a home in Seward, Nebraska. A potential buyer exercised her right to a home inspection, and Steinhausen performed the inspection. Nitz testified that some of the items in Steinhausen's report "were unquestionably beyond the scope of a typical home inspection." Nitz felt that Steinhausen's comments on "non-condition related items" were "likely to tear apart transactions when property condition was not a real issue, to the detriment of a seller."

HomeServices provides its real estate agents with access to a company e-mail network. The network uses "group email lists," or listservs, including the "HRE-HOTSHEET" and "WBR-HOTSHEET" lists (collectively the Hotsheets). The Hotsheets include the e-mail addresses of current HomeServices real estate agents and employees and are accessed through their individual e-mail accounts.

HomeServices' vice president stated that agents use the Hotsheets as a forum to share information and opinions on topics related to the real estate business:

It is common for HomeServices Sales Associates to use the Hotsheets to send emails to other HomeServices Sales Associates to obtain information, market properties, and

discuss current issues or questions on which they share a common interest, for example, questions or comments about particular aspects of real estate transactions, availability of properties and developments, real estate rules, regulations and practices and how they relate to real estate transactions, or questions or comments about vendors who work in the real estate sales community.

Nitz averred that, in her experience, HomeServices agents use the Hotsheets to communicate amongst themselves their opinions of other Realtors and vendors in the real estate business.

On January 14, 2011, Nitz posted a reply to an e-mail on the Hotsheets with the subject "RE: Steinhausen inspections." Nitz' e-mail stated in its entirety: "He did an inspection in Seward for the agent that sold one of my listings. I will never let him near one of my listings ever again!!! Total idiot."

The record shows that at least two other HomeServices agents sent e-mails on the same subject to the Hotsheets before Nitz sent her e-mail. The author of the first e-mail stated, "IN MY OPINION," Steinhausen was not qualified to inspect residential structures. The author of the second e-mail stated that inspections performed by Steinhausen were poor and that Steinhausen addressed issues unrelated to structural soundness. After Nitz sent her e-mail, another HomeServices agent replied that Steinhausen was "not professional."

Nitz stated that she "did not have any specific facts in mind" when she wrote her e-mail. Nitz did "recall[] having a generally negative impression of . . . Steinhausen and the inspection he conducted" and used the phrase "total idiot" to "express that generally negative opinion."

At some point in January 2011, Steinhausen received an anonymous letter in the U.S. mail that included a copy of Nitz' e-mail. Steinhausen testified that the letter had no return address and that he did not know who had sent the letter.

After requesting a retraction from Nitz, Steinhausen filed a complaint with the State Real Estate Commission in February 2011 alleging that Nitz' e-mail violated Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-885.24(22) and (29) (Cum. Supp. 2010). Section 81-885.24 authorizes the commission to discipline real estate brokers who commit certain unfair trade practices, including, under subsection (22), "[m]aking any substantial misrepresentations" and, under subsection (29), "[d]emonstrating negligence, incompetency, or unworthiness to act as a broker . . ." Nitz signed a consent order with the commission that determined that she had violated § 81-885.24(29). The commission ordered Nitz to complete 6 hours of ethics courses.

Steinhausen claimed that Nitz' January 14, 2011, e-mail interfered with his business relationships with HomeServices, agents of HomeServices, and prospective clients. In particular, Steinhausen testified that several HomeServices agents dissuaded their clients from contracting with SHI. Steinhausen estimated that he suffered \$30,000 per year in lost business following Nitz' e-mail and would continue to suffer the same losses for the next 25 years.

Steinhausen testified that Nitz' e-mail and its aftermath also weighed on him personally. According to Steinhausen, he "was physically ill" after learning about Nitz' e-mail and "went through a period of depression, anger, [and] sadness." Steinhausen testified that he had trouble sleeping but that he had not visited a medical doctor or been diagnosed with depression.

2. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Steinhausen—who testified that he was not represented by a lawyer—filed a “Pro Se Civil Complaint” in January 2012, identifying himself as the “Owner / Operator” of “Steinhausen Home Inspections.” The caption identified the plaintiff as “MATTHEW M. STEINHAUSEN D/B/A STEINHAUSEN HOME INSPECTIONS, LLC,” and the defendants as “HOMSERVICES OF NEBRASKA, INC. and SHELLY J. NITZ and WOODS BROTHERS REALTY.” The complaint—stating claims of libel, false light invasion of privacy, and tortious interference with a business relationship or expectancy—appears to allege wrongs committed against both Steinhausen and SHI. For example, the opening sentence states that the “Plaintiff” is “Matthew M. Steinhausen, a small business owner residing in rural Lincoln,” and alleges that the defendants “publicly placed the Plaintiff in a false light.” The same paragraph, however, contains allegations that Nitz “defamed Steinhausen Home Inspections” and that HomeServices and Woods Brothers Realty “creat[ed] an environment of discrimination towards Steinhausen Home Inspections, LLC.” The requested relief includes damages for “economic loss” and “emotional suffering” and an injunction prohibiting HomeServices “from discrimination of Steinhausen Home Inspections.”

The defendants filed a joint answer that generally denied the allegations in the complaint. The defendants affirmatively alleged that Nitz’ statement was opinion, Nitz’ statement was protected by a qualified privilege, and Woods Brothers Realty is a trade name owned by HomeServices and, therefore, not a proper party.

The trial court sustained the motions of Nitz and HomeServices for summary judgment against each of the claims in the complaint. The court noted that Woods Brothers Realty is a “trade name[] and not [a] corporate entit[y].” As to the libel claim, the court held that a qualified privilege protected Nitz’ e-mail and that she had not abused the privilege. The court held that the false light claim based on the same e-mail was “subsumed within the defamation claim.” For the claimed interference with business relationships or expectancies, the court held that the evidence showed that Steinhausen did not have a valid business relationship or expectancy with either Nitz or HomeServices.

Steinhausen appealed, and the caption on the cover of his brief identified the appellant as “MATTHEW M. STEINHAUSEN; D/B/A Steinhausen Home Inspections, LLC.” The notice of appeal states that the party appealing is “Plaintiff, Matthew M. Steinhausen.” The Nebraska Court of Appeals ordered the “Appellant” to show cause why it should not dismiss the appeal because SHI had not appeared by an attorney licensed to practice law in Nebraska. After the parties submitted responsive briefs, the court determined that cause had been shown and that the appeal could proceed. But the court cautioned that Steinhausen “may only proceed ‘pro se’ with regard to claims on his own behalf as an individual, and not on behalf of Steinhausen Home Inspections, LLC.” After the Court of Appeals’ order, we moved the appeal to our docket under our statutory authority to regulate the caseloads of the appellate courts of the state.

III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Steinhausen assigns, restated, that the district court erred by determining that (1) Nitz’ e-mail was privileged, (2) the privilege was not abused by actual malice, (3) Steinhausen had no valid business relationship or expectancy, (4) the false light invasion of privacy claim was

subsumed within the libel claim, and (5) certain exhibits offered by Steinhausen were not admissible. Steinhausen also assigns that the court erred by “not properly applying the tests or elements of ‘protected opinion,’” although the court did not decide whether Nitz’ e-mail was capable of defamatory meaning.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1,2] We will affirm a lower court’s grant of summary judgment if the pleadings and admitted evidence show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from the facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.¹ In reviewing a summary judgment, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment was granted, and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence.²

V. ANALYSIS

1. STEINHAUSEN’S CAPACITY TO APPEAL

HomeServices argues that “Steinhausen’s appeal was made on behalf of only one appellant, the business, as opposed to the business and himself individually.”³ HomeServices concedes that Steinhausen could raise on appeal “claims which he holds on behalf of himself individually,” but contends that “[h]is Complaint alleges no harm against him personally”⁴ Because Steinhausen is not licensed to practice law in Nebraska, HomeServices concludes that the “appeal is a nullity and should be dismissed.”⁵ Steinhausen states in his response to the show cause order that he, and not SHI—which he refers to as “the professional identity for individual home inspector Matthew M. Steinhausen”—is the sole party to the appeal. Steinhausen explains that he merely “included his business name on the complaint to clarify his position as the individual owner / operator of Steinhausen Home Inspections, LLC.”⁶

(a) Representation of a Business Entity by a Layperson

Persons not licensed to practice law in Nebraska are prohibited from prosecuting an action or filing papers in the courts of this state on behalf of another. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 7-101 (Reissue 2012) provides:

[N]o person shall practice as an attorney or counselor at law, or commence, conduct or defend any action or proceeding to which he is not a party, either by using or subscribing his own name, or the name of any other person, or by drawing pleadings or other papers

¹ *deNourie & Yost Homes v. Frost*, ante p. 136, 854 N.W.2d 298 (2014).

² *Id.*

³ Brief for appellee HomeServices at 35.

⁴ *Id.*

⁵ *Id.*

⁶ Reply brief for appellant at 14.

to be signed and filed by a party, in any court of record of this state, unless he has been previously admitted to the bar by order of the Supreme Court of this state. No such paper shall be received or filed in any action or proceeding unless the same bears the endorsement of some admitted attorney, or is drawn, signed, and presented by a party to the action or proceeding.

But, under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 7-110 (Reissue 2012), “[p]laintiffs shall have the liberty of prosecuting, and defendants shall have the liberty of defending, in their proper persons.” We have explained that the phrase “in their proper persons” means “in their own persons.”⁷

The prohibition of the unauthorized practice of law is not for the benefit of lawyers.⁸ Prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law protects citizens and litigants in the administration of justice from the mistakes of the ignorant on the one hand and the machinations of the unscrupulous on the other.⁹

[3] A legal proceeding in which a party is represented by a person not admitted to practice law is a nullity and is subject to dismissal.¹⁰ An individual can represent himself in legal proceedings in his own behalf, but one who is not an attorney cannot represent others.¹¹ And the rule that a layperson cannot appear in court in a representative capacity cannot be circumvented by subterfuge.¹²

The prohibition on representation by a layperson applies to entities. For example, we have held that a corporation,¹³ a partnership,¹⁴ and a trust¹⁵ must be represented by a member of the bar. We have never addressed whether the same rule applies to a limited liability company (LLC), which is “a hybrid of the partnership and corporate forms.”¹⁶ But other courts have held

⁷ *Niklaus v. Abel Construction Co.*, 164 Neb. 842, 849, 83 N.W.2d 904, 909 (1957).

⁸ *State ex rel. Comm. on Unauth. Prac. of Law v. Hansen*, 286 Neb. 69, 834 N.W.2d 793 (2013).

⁹ *Id.*

¹⁰ *Id.*

¹¹ *Waite v. Carpenter*, 1 Neb. App. 321, 496 N.W.2d 1 (1992).

¹² *Niklaus v. Abel Construction Co.*, *supra* note 7, citing *Bay Bar Ass'n v. Finance System, Inc.*, 345 Mich. 434, 76 N.W.2d 23 (1956).

¹³ See *Niklaus v. Abel Const. Co.*, *supra* note 7.

¹⁴ *Anderzhon/Architects v. 57 Oxbow II Partnership*, 250 Neb. 768, 553 N.W.2d 157 (1996).

¹⁵ *Black Acres Pure Trust v. Fahnlander*, 233 Neb. 28, 443 N.W.2d 604 (1989). See, also, *Turbines Ltd. v. Transupport, Inc.*, 19 Neb. App. 485, 808 N.W.2d 643 (2012); *Goodwin v. Hobza*, 17 Neb. App. 353, 762 N.W.2d 623 (2009); *Galaxy Telecom v. SRS, Inc.*, 13 Neb. App. 178, 689 N.W.2d 866 (2004); *Waite v. Carpenter*, *supra* note 11.

¹⁶ *Lattanzio v. COMTA*, 481 F.3d 137, 140 (2d Cir. 2007).

that LLC's must also be represented in court by a licensed attorney,¹⁷ including LLC's with a single member.¹⁸

[4] We conclude that a licensed member of the Nebraska bar must represent an LLC in the courts of this state. An LLC is an entity distinct from its members.¹⁹ It has the capacity to sue and be sued in its own name,²⁰ but like a corporation, an LLC is an abstraction, and "abstractions cannot appear pro se."²¹ Furthermore, the right to conduct business as an LLC confers a significant privilege on its members: limited liability.²² The Legislature's grace "'carries with it obligations one of which is to hire a lawyer if you want to sue or defend on behalf of the entity.'"²³

We decline to recognize an exception for LLC's with a single member. Because Steinhausen is the sole member of SHI, it might be true that no other person's financial interest in SHI would be harmed by Steinhausen's lay representation. But a layperson's lack of professional skills and ethical obligations "imposes undue burdens on opposing parties and the courts," and "[t]hese considerations are just as important when the LLC has only one owner."²⁴ And the limited liability Steinhausen enjoys is no less limited because he is the sole member of SHI.²⁵ Put simply, having called into being a new juridical person, Steinhausen cannot ignore SHI's separate existence when it sues him.

(b) Parties to the Appeal

[5] To the extent that Steinhausen appeals on behalf of SHI, the appeal is a nullity. But Steinhausen has the right to prosecute an appeal in his own behalf.²⁶ When a layperson appeals both in his own behalf and on behalf of a business entity, we have dismissed the appeal as to the

¹⁷ E.g., *Smith v. Rustic Home Builders, LLC*, 826 N.W.2d 357 (S.D. 2013).

¹⁸ See, *Lattanzio v. COMTA*, *supra* note 16; *Dutch Village Mall v. Pelletti*, 162 Wash. App. 531, 256 P.3d 1251 (2011). See, also, *U.S. v. Hagerman*, 545 F.3d 579 (8th Cir. 2008); *U.S. v. High Country Broadcasting Co., Inc.*, 3 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1993); *National Ind. Theatre v. Buena Vista Distribution*, 748 F.2d 602 (11th Cir. 1984); *Capital Group, Inc. v. Gaston & Snow*, 768 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Wis. 1991).

¹⁹ Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-104(a) (Reissue 2012).

²⁰ Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-105 (Reissue 2012).

²¹ *Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc.*, 772 F.2d 1423, 1427 (7th Cir. 1985). See, also, *U.S. v. Hagerman*, *supra* note 18.

²² See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-129(a) (Reissue 2012).

²³ *Smith v. Rustic Home Builders, LLC*, *supra* note 17, 826 N.W.2d at 360.

²⁴ *Dutch Village Mall v. Pelletti*, *supra* note 18, 162 Wash. App. at 534, 256 P.3d at 1252. See, also, Annot., 8 A.L.R.5th 653 (1992).

²⁵ See *Dutch Village Mall v. Pelletti*, *supra* note 18.

²⁶ See § 7-110.

entity but considered the merits of the appeal as to the errors assigned by the layperson in his own behalf.²⁷ So, we must determine whether Steinhausen's appeal is solely for SHI.

Confusion as to the identity of the plaintiff (or plaintiffs) below and the appellant (or appellants) on appeal is apparent on the face of the pleadings and briefs. As noted above, the caption of the "Pro Se Civil Complaint" labeled the plaintiff "MATTHEW M. STEINHAUSEN D/B/A STEINHAUSEN HOME INSPECTIONS, LLC." Steinhausen signed the complaint as the "Owner / Operator" of "Steinhausen Home Inspections." Similarly, the cover of the appellate brief filed by Steinhausen--again identifying himself as the "owner / operator" of "Steinhausen Home Inspections, LLC"--labels the appellant "MATTHEW STEINHAUSEN; D/B/A Steinhausen Home Inspections, LLC." Generally, the designation "[d]oing business as," or "d/b/a," "precedes a person's or business's assumed name."²⁸

[6-8] But we do not restrict our inquiry to the titles of the complaint and the appellant's brief. The character in which one is a party to a suit, and the capacity in which a party sues, is determined from the allegations of the pleadings and not from the caption alone.²⁹ If the capacity in which a party sues is doubtful, a court may examine the complaint, the pleadings as a whole, and even the entire record.³⁰ And, when the pleadings show a cause of action by a person in his individual capacity, a court may reject words indicating representative capacity.³¹

Here, Steinhausen argues that he is the sole appellant whereas the defendants argue that SHI is the sole appellant. Both Steinhausen and HomeServices note that the pleadings and briefs have consistently referred to a single "plaintiff" or "appellant." But the relief requested in the complaint is inconsistent with a reading that there is a single plaintiff. For example, the complaint prays for an injunction preventing discrimination against SHI and, three paragraphs later, damages for emotional distress. Steinhausen argues that "[l]ibel, libel per se and false light invasion of privacy are all torts affecting individual persons, not businesses."³² As such, Steinhausen contends that "[t]he claims . . . regarding these aspects of his case are obviously related to his status as an individual, not a business."³³ Steinhausen is correct that a business entity, like an LLC, cannot maintain an action for invasion of privacy.³⁴ But a business entity may maintain a defamation action if the publication directly relates to its business, property, or

²⁷ See *Anderzhon/Architects v. 57 Oxbow II Partnership*, *supra* note 14. See, also, *Goodwin v. Hobza*, *supra* note 15.

²⁸ Black's Law Dictionary 481 (10th ed. 2014).

²⁹ See *State on behalf of Dunn v. Wiegand*, 2 Neb. App. 580, 512 N.W.2d 419 (1994). See, also, 59 Am. Jur. 2d *Parties* § 14 (2012).

³⁰ 67A C.J.S. *Parties* § 177 (2013). See, also, *Niklaus v. Abel Construction Co.*, *supra* note 7; *Burke v. Unique Printing Co.*, 63 Neb. 264, 88 N.W. 488 (1901).

³¹ 67A C.J.S., *supra* note 30, § 178. See, also, *Andres v. Kridler*, 47 Neb. 585, 66 N.W. 649 (1896); *Thomas v. Carson*, 46 Neb. 765, 65 N.W. 899 (1896).

³² Reply brief for appellant at 14.

³³ *Id.*

³⁴ See, 77 C.J.S. *Right of Privacy and Publicity* § 43 (2006). See, also, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-201 (Reissue 2012).

credit.³⁵ Furthermore, the same communication might in some cases defame both the business entity and an individual owner.³⁶

After examining the pleadings, briefs, and record as a whole, we conclude that Steinhausen has prosecuted this action and attempted to appeal for both himself and SHI. Because his appeal on behalf of SHI is a nullity, we dismiss it. We will consider only the errors assigned by Steinhausen as they relate to claims he could make in his own behalf.

2. DEFAMATION

On appeal, Nitz argues that the court should have determined whether her statement was capable of defamatory meaning before deciding whether it was privileged. Nitz contends that “[i]n today’s parlance, ‘idiot’ is merely a subjective pejorative term.”³⁷ Nitz argues that in the context of the Hotsheets—which she refers to as a place for HomeServices agents to “express their opinions without pulling punches”³⁸—the phrase “total idiot” is not “a factual statement that [Steinhausen] is mentally defective.”³⁹ Steinhausen responds that “[i]diocy is verifiable” and “can be defined and proved.”⁴⁰ He notes that “idiot” is defined in one dictionary as “a stupid person or a mentally handicapped person” and asserts that he “is neither stupid nor mentally handicapped.”⁴¹

[9,10] In the ordinary case, a defamation claim has four elements: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party, (3) fault amounting to at least negligence on the part of the publisher, and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication.⁴² A communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.⁴³

[11,12] The threshold question in a defamation suit is whether a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the published statements imply a provably false factual assertion.⁴⁴ Statements of fact can be defamatory whereas statements of opinion—the publication of which is protected by the First Amendment—cannot.⁴⁵ Put another way, “subjective impressions” cannot

³⁵ 53 C.J.S. *Libel and Slander; Injurious Falsehood* § 172 (2005).

³⁶ See *id.*

³⁷ Brief for appellee Nitz at 26.

³⁸ *Id.* at 21.

³⁹ *Id.* at 26.

⁴⁰ Reply brief for appellant at 6.

⁴¹ *Id.* at 7.

⁴² See *Moats v. Republican Party of Neb.*, 281 Neb. 411, 796 N.W.2d 584 (2011).

⁴³ *Id.*

⁴⁴ *Wheeler v. Nebraska State Bar Assn.*, 244 Neb. 786, 508 N.W.2d 917 (1993).

⁴⁵ See *Moats v. Republican Party of Neb.*, *supra* note 42.

be defamatory, as contrasted with objective "expressions of verifiable facts."⁴⁶ Distinguishing the two presents a question of law for the trial judge to decide.⁴⁷ In making this distinction, courts apply a totality of the circumstances test.⁴⁸ Relevant factors include (1) whether the general tenor of the entire work negates the impression that the defendant asserted an objective fact, (2) whether the defendant used figurative or hyperbolic language, and (3) whether the statement is susceptible of being proved true or false.⁴⁹

And context is important to whether an ordinary reader would view a statement as one of fact or opinion.⁵⁰ In addition to the content of the communication, a court looks to the knowledge, understanding, and reasonable expectations of the audience to whom the communication was directed, taking cues from "the broader setting in which the statement appears."⁵¹ Words, particularly the pejorative ones, often have both a literal and figurative meaning.⁵² Whether the statement is capable of being defamatory depends on which meaning was used, which can be answered only by examining the context in which the language appears.⁵³

[13] As noted, whether the language is hyperbolic is relevant to distinguishing fact from opinion. Rhetorical hyperbole—"language that, in context, was obviously understood as an exaggeration, rather than a statement of literal fact"—is not actionable.⁵⁴ In particular, "[t]he ad hominem nature of abusive epithets, vulgarities, and profanities,"⁵⁵ which some writers "use to enliven their prose,"⁵⁶ indicates that the statement is hyperbole.

Exercises in "name calling"⁵⁷ generally fall under the category of rhetorical hyperbole.⁵⁸ For example, courts have held that "'idiot,'"⁵⁹ "'raving idiot,'"⁶⁰ "[i]diots [a]float,"⁶¹ and more

⁴⁶ *K Corporation v. Stewart*, 247 Neb. 290, 297, 526 N.W.2d 429, 435 (1995).

⁴⁷ *Moats v. Republican Party of Neb.*, *supra* note 42.

⁴⁸ *Wheeler v. Nebraska State Bar Assn.*, *supra* note 44.

⁴⁹ See *Moats v. Republican Party of Neb.*, *supra* note 42.

⁵⁰ See *K Corporation v. Stewart*, *supra* note 46.

⁵¹ *Id.* at 296, 526 N.W.2d at 435. See 50 Am. Jur. 2d *Libel and Slander* § 111 (2006).

⁵² See *Dilworth v. Dudley*, 75 F.3d 307 (7th Cir. 1996).

⁵³ *Id.*

⁵⁴ 50 Am. Jur. 2d, *supra* note 51, § 110 at 466.

⁵⁵ *Id.*, § 111 at 466-67.

⁵⁶ *Id.*, § 110 at 466.

⁵⁷ See *Chang v. Cargill, Inc.*, 168 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1011 (D. Minn. 2001).

⁵⁸ See, e.g., *Blomberg v. Cox Enterprises, Inc.*, 228 Ga. App. 178, 491 S.E.2d 430 (1997).

⁵⁹ *Robel v. Roundup Corp.*, 148 Wash. 2d 35, 56, 59 P.3d 611, 622 (2002). Accord *Blouin v. Anton*, 139 Vt. 618, 431 A.2d 489 (1981).

⁶⁰ *DeMoya v. Walsh*, 441 So. 2d 1120, 1120 (Fla. App. 1983).

⁶¹ *Cowan v. Time, Inc.*, 41 Misc. 2d 198, 198, 245 N.Y.S.2d 723, 725 (N.Y. Sup. 1963).

vulgar variants⁶² were rude statements of opinion, rather than lay diagnoses of mental capacity. Similarly, courts have held that statements calling the plaintiff “stupid,”⁶³ a “moron,”⁶⁴ and a “nincompoop,”⁶⁵ were not actionable. Courts have also held that statements potentially referring to the plaintiff’s mental health, such as “raving maniac,”⁶⁶ “pitiable lunatics,”⁶⁷ “wacko,” “nut job,” and “hysterical,”⁶⁸ “crazy,”⁶⁹ and “crank,”⁷⁰ were statements of opinion.

To analyze Nitz’ communication, we begin with the context in which it was made. Nitz sent the e-mail to the Hotsheets, which the evidence shows are accessed by HomeServices real estate agents and used, among other purposes, as a forum to express their thoughts on vendors in the real estate community. The reasonable expectations of the audience of Nitz’ e-mail (members of the Hotsheets) depend on how members used the forum, particularly whether the Hotsheets were a “place[] that invited exaggeration and personal opinion.”⁷¹ At least two other e-mails on the subject of “Steinhausen inspections” preceded Nitz’ e-mail. The first, prefaced by “IN MY OPINION,” suggested that Steinhausen “should never be allowed to inspect even a dog house.” The second called inspections performed by Steinhausen “horrendous.”

We next turn to the language of Nitz’ e-mail itself. To recap, Nitz stated: “He did an inspection in Seward for the agent that sold one of my listings. I will never let him near one of my listings ever again!!! Total idiot.” The word “total” means “complete in extent or degree” or “absolute.”⁷² In some contexts, “idiot” might refer to an objective state of mental capacity and particularly to a person “lacking the capacity to develop beyond the mental age of three or four years.”⁷³ But “idiot” can also refer to “an utterly foolish or senseless person,”⁷⁴ and we conclude that Nitz used this meaning. The broad setting of Nitz’ statement—along with the superfluous exclamation marks and the adjective “[t]otal”—shows that the statement was hyperbolic rhetoric rather than a reference to arrested intellectual development. Whether a person is “foolish” or “senseless” is a “subjective impression[]” and not an objective “expression[] of verifiable

⁶² See *Chang v. Cargill, Inc.*, *supra* note 57.

⁶³ *Id.* at 1011.

⁶⁴ *Purcell v. Ewing*, 560 F. Supp. 2d 337, 343 (M.D. Pa. 2008).

⁶⁵ *Stepien v. Franklin*, 39 Ohio App. 3d 47, 49, 528 N.E.2d 1324, 1327 (1988).

⁶⁶ *DeMoya v. Walsh*, *supra* note 60, 441 So. 2d at 1120.

⁶⁷ *Thomas v. News World Communications*, 681 F. Supp. 55, 64 (D.D.C. 1988).

⁶⁸ *Lapine v. Seinfeld*, 31 Misc. 3d 736, 752, 754, 918 N.Y.S.2d 313, 326, 327 (N.Y. Sup. 2011).

⁶⁹ *Stepien v. Franklin*, *supra* note 65, 39 Ohio App. 3d at 49, 528 N.E.2d at 1327.

⁷⁰ *Dilworth v. Dudley*, *supra* note 52, 75 F.3d at 310.

⁷¹ *Robel v. Roundup Corp.*, *supra* note 59, 148 Wash. 2d at 56, 59 P.3d at 622.

⁷² Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language 1497 (1989).

⁷³ *Id.* at 708.

⁷⁴ *Id.*

facts.”⁷⁵ Nitz’ e-mail might have been distasteful, but it was a statement of opinion and, therefore, not defamatory.

3. FALSE LIGHT INVASION OF PRIVACY

Steinhausen argues that his false light invasion of privacy claim is not subsumed into his libel claim because he “clearly separated libel from false light in his arguments.”⁷⁶ Nitz and HomeServices respond that Steinhausen cannot maintain a false light invasion of privacy claim in addition to libel because both claims are based on the same statement.

Invasion of privacy as a common-law tort has evolved over the years into several separate torts, one of which is placing a person before the public in a false light. The contours of the tort are now governed by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-204 (Reissue 2012), which provides:

Any person, firm, or corporation which gives publicity to a matter concerning a natural person that places that person before the public in a false light is subject to liability for invasion of privacy, if:

(1) The false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; and

(2) The actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.

[14] We have held that if a plaintiff asserts claims of both libel and false light invasion of privacy based on the same statement, the false light claim is subsumed within the defamation claim and is not separately actionable.⁷⁷ Steinhausen argues that Nitz’ e-mail was both a libel and a false light invasion of privacy. The district court did not err by concluding that the claim for the latter was subsumed within the claim for the former.

4. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH A BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP OR EXPECTANCY

The district court entered summary judgment against Steinhausen’s tortious interference with a business relationship or expectancy claim because the record showed that Steinhausen did not have a business relationship or expectancy with Nitz or HomeServices. On appeal, Steinhausen contends that “[t]he business relationship to which [he] is claiming interference is the relationship between [him] and his home inspection clients being discouraged by Nitz and other HomeServices associates not to use [Steinhausen].”⁷⁸

[15] To succeed on a claim for tortious interference with a business relationship or expectancy, a plaintiff must prove (1) the existence of a valid business relationship or expectancy, (2) knowledge by the interferer of the relationship or expectancy, (3) an unjustified intentional act of interference on the part of the interferer, (4) proof that the interference caused

⁷⁵ *K Corporation v. Stewart*, *supra* note 46, 247 Neb. at 297, 526 N.W.2d at 435.

⁷⁶ Reply brief for appellant at 9.

⁷⁷ *Moats v. Republican Party of Neb.*, *supra* note 42.

⁷⁸ Brief for appellant at 18.

the harm sustained, and (5) damage to the party whose relationship or expectancy was disrupted.⁷⁹ The interference must impact a valid business relationship or expectancy,⁸⁰ and the relationship or expectancy interfered with “must belong to the party asserting the claim.”⁸¹

[16] Members of an LLC cannot, in their own behalf, maintain a claim for tortious interference with the business relationships or expectancies of the LLC.⁸² Only the parties to the relationship or expectancy interfered with may bring a tortious interference claim.⁸³ That a member of an LLC might experience reduced distributions from the LLC if the entity’s relationships are interfered with does not convert the claim to one in behalf of the member personally.⁸⁴

Here, the evidence shows that any relationships or expectancies with Nitz, HomeServices, or prospective buyers of home inspection services are the relationships and expectancies of SHI, and not Steinhausen personally. Steinhausen formed SHI in 2004, aware that doing so would allow him to “limit[] [his] liability to the outside world.” All of the home inspection reports in the record show that the business relationship was between SHI and the individual home buyers. For example, each report contains a “Home Inspection Agreement” stating that “Steinhausen Home Inspections LLC, DBA Steinhausen Home Inspections,” or simply “Steinhausen Home Inspections,” “agrees with customer to provide services related to the review and subsequent inspection report of home and property as requested by customer.” In response to Nitz’ request for “[a]ll federal and state income tax returns filed by Matthew M. Steinhausen since the creation of [SHI],” Steinhausen produced only the Schedule C or Schedule C-EZ he filed for tax years 2007 to 2012. Steinhausen stated that the request was “overly broad” to the extent it requested “all tax returns filed by Matthew M. Steinhausen, rather than the returns that relate to [SHI].” The sole “Business name” on each of the Schedule C or Schedule C-EZ’s is SHI.

Put simply, while there might be evidence of interference with SHI’s business relationships or expectancies, the record lacks any evidence that Steinhausen himself had any business relationships or expectancies. As the sole member of SHI, Steinhausen might have experienced reduced distributions from SHI if SHI’s business was interfered with. But this does

⁷⁹ *Professional Mgmt. Midwest v. Lund Co.*, 284 Neb. 777, 826 N.W.2d 225 (2012).

⁸⁰ *Huff v. Swartz*, 258 Neb. 820, 606 N.W.2d 461 (2000).

⁸¹ *Pinnacle Fitness v. Jerry and Vickie Moyes*, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1098 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (applying Arizona law).

⁸² See, *Painter’s Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown*, 716 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 2013); *Pinnacle Fitness v. Jerry and Vickie Moyes*, *supra* note 81; *Baron Financial Corp. v. Natanzon*, 471 F. Supp. 2d 535 (D. Md. 2006). See, also, *Hilderman v. Enea TekSci, Inc.*, 551 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (S.D. Cal. 2008); *Picture Lake Campground v. Holiday Inns, Inc.*, 497 F. Supp. 858 (E.D. Va. 1980); *First Commercial Bank, N.A. v. Walker*, 333 Ark. 100, 969 S.W.2d 146 (1998); *Benton v. Kennedy-Van Saun Mfg. & Eng. Corp.*, 145 N.Y.S.2d 703 (N.Y. Sup. 1955); *Waller v. Waller*, 187 Md. 185, 49 A.2d 449 (Md. 1946); *Sutter v. General Petroleum Corp.*, 28 Cal. 2d 525, 170 P.2d 898 (1946). But see *Resonant Sensors, Inc. v. SRU Biosystems, Inc.*, 651 F. Supp. 2d 562 (N.D. Tex. 2009).

⁸³ See, e.g., *Baron Financial Corp. v. Natanzon*, *supra* note 82.

⁸⁴ See, e.g., *Painter’s Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown*, *supra* note 82.

not permit him to maintain an action for interference with SHI's business relationships and expectancies. Steinhausen failed to produce evidence creating a genuine factual dispute regarding the first element of a tortious interference with a business relationship or expectancy claim: A valid business relationship or expectancy.

5. EVIDENCE

Steinhausen argues that the court erred by excluding certain exhibits offered by him and a portion of Nitz' deposition. The court sustained the defendants' objections to exhibits 11 through 16 offered by Steinhausen on the ground that they were not among the types of evidence that may be received on a motion for summary judgment under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1332 (Reissue 2008). The court also sustained the defendants' form and foundation objections to a portion of Nitz' deposition. In a footnote to its order, however, the court stated that "[t]he majority of the documents contained in Exhibits 11 through 16 are contained in other exhibits received by the court and have been considered accordingly."

[17,18] In a civil case, the admission or exclusion of evidence is not reversible error unless it unfairly prejudiced a substantial right of the complaining party.⁸⁵ The exclusion of evidence is ordinarily not prejudicial where substantially similar evidence is admitted without objection.⁸⁶ In particular, where the information contained in an exhibit is, for the most part, already in evidence from the testimony of witnesses, the exclusion of the exhibit is not prejudicial.⁸⁷

We conclude that the exclusion of exhibits 11 through 16 did not unfairly prejudice a substantial right of Steinhausen. The court received the documents comprising exhibits 11, 12, 13, 15, and 16 elsewhere in the same form or with immaterial formatting differences. Exhibit 14 is the consent order issued by the State Real Estate Commission and signed by Nitz. Witnesses testified as to the type of order issued by the commission, the findings of the commission, and the discipline Nitz received. The handful of facts contained in the "stipulations" portion of the consent order are reflected elsewhere in the evidence.

We also conclude that the exclusion of a portion of Nitz' deposition did not unfairly prejudice a substantial right of Steinhausen. The court excluded 23 lines of Nitz' deposition, in which Steinhausen asked Nitz whether any information in the report for the 2008 Seward inspection was inaccurate or whether he "overlooked or missed" anything. Nitz replied that she did not know. In a portion of Nitz' deposition that the court received, Steinhausen asked Nitz whether she "kn[e]w of any problems with the [Seward property] that were overlooked or unreported by [Steinhausen]." Nitz testified that she did not know. Because the court received substantially similar evidence, the exclusion of a portion of Nitz' deposition did not unfairly prejudice a substantial right of Steinhausen.

⁸⁵ *Hess v. State*, 287 Neb. 559, 843 N.W.2d 648 (2014). See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-103(1) (Reissue 2008).

⁸⁶ See *Livingston v. Metropolitan Util. Dist.*, 269 Neb. 301, 692 N.W.2d 475 (2005).

⁸⁷ *Durrett v. Baxter Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.*, 198 Neb. 392, 253 N.W.2d 37 (1977).

VI. CONCLUSION

Steinhausen has attempted to appeal for both himself and SHI, the LLC of which he is the sole member. Because Steinhausen is not licensed to practice law in Nebraska, his appeal for SHI is a nullity.

As to the errors assigned by Steinhausen in his own behalf, we conclude that the e-mail sent by Nitz stated an opinion and, therefore, was not actionable as libel. The false light invasion of privacy claim was subsumed within the libel claim because both claims were based on the same statement. Finally, Steinhausen's tortious interference claim fails because he did not produce evidence that he, personally, had a valid business relationship or expectancy that could have been interfered with.

In its order sustaining the defendants' motions for summary judgment, the district court stated that "[t]he Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with prejudice." Steinhausen attempted to prosecute this action both in his own behalf and on behalf of SHI, but his attempt to do so on behalf of SHI was a nullity. Therefore, the judgment as it relates to SHI must be vacated. We affirm the judgment as to Steinhausen in his personal capacity.

AFFIRMED IN PART, AND IN PART REVERSED
AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

WRIGHT, J., not participating.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SCOTTS BLUFF COUNTY, NEBRASKA

GLENN R. WAITE,)
)
 Plaintiff,)
)
 v.)
)
 REGIONAL WEST MEDICAL CENTER,)
 LEO DOBROVOLNY, District Judge; and)
 RANDALL LIPPSTREU, District Judge,)
)
 Defendants.)

CASE NO. CI13-109
JOURNAL ENTRY
AND ORDER

NOW ON THIS 8th day of April, 2013, the above-entitled matter comes on for hearing by telephone conference. The Plaintiff appears, *pro se*. The Defendant, Regional West, is represented by its attorney, Dean J. Sitzmann. The Defendants, Dobrovolny and Lippstreu, are represented by their attorney, Stephanie Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General.

The Plaintiff's Motion to Continue this hearing is denied.
Argument is then made, and the Court finds:

- A. The Motions to Dismiss the Complaint filed February 14, 2013, as well as the Amended Complaint filed March 21, 2013, are each taken under advisement.
- B. The Plaintiff will be allowed to file his reply brief by April 19, 2013 at 4:00 p.m., as well as any documents he wishes the Court to consider. The Defendants will then have until April 30, 2013 at 4:00 p.m. to file their rebuttal briefs, and any objections to documents submitted by the Plaintiff.

NOW ON THIS 8th day of May, 2013, pending Motions to Dismiss come on for disposition. The Court after being fully advised finds:

- 1. This Court takes judicial notice of the following cases which have previously been filed in the District Court of Scotts Bluff County, Nebraska:



000165825D21

FILED May 8 2013

Ann Rosenberry
CLERK OF THE DIST COURT

BY *Antonia Caste* DEPUTY

No. 38267
No. 38268
No. 38269
No. 38270
No. 38271
No. 38279
CI11-282

In the event of an appeal by any party, the Clerk of the District Court of Scotts Bluff County, Nebraska shall include a certified copy of all of the documents in the above-entitled cases as part of the transcript in this proceeding.

2. This Court further takes judicial notice of:

Neb. Rev. Stat. Section 7-101
Neb. Rev. Stat. Section 30-810
Waite v. Carpenter, 1 Neb. App. 321, 496 N.W.2d 1 (1992)
Walte v. Carpenter, 3 Neb. App. 879, 533 N.W.2d 917 (1995)
Nebraska Court of Appeals Case A-07-473
Nebraska Supreme Court Case No. S-12-000631

3. An action for wrongful death did not exist at common law, and thus exists solely by virtue of legislative enactment. *Nelson v. Dolan*, 230 Neb. 848, 434 N.W.2d 25 (1989). The manner of bringing a wrongful death action, including the measure of damages and the statute of limitations, is therefore clearly controlled by the Nebraska statutes.

Neb. Rev. Stat. Section 30-810 specifically provides that an action for wrongful death shall be commenced within two years after the death of such person. It shall be brought by and in the name of the person's personal representative for the exclusive benefit of the widow or widower and next of kin.

4. There is no doubt that an individual may represent himself or herself and participate in trials and legal proceedings on his or her own behalf. However, it is equally clear the one who is not an attorney may not represent others in legal proceedings, nor may such a person practice law for others.

Under Nebraska law, a personal representative is a fiduciary who shall observe the standards of care applicable to trustees. The rule

against nonattorneys appearing in a representative capacity cannot be avoided by subterfuge.

A nonattorney personal representative is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law if he personally brings a wrongful death action for medical negligence on behalf of the deceased's estate. *Waite v. Carpenter*, 1 Neb. App. 321, 496 N.W.2d 1 (1992).

5. Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, the holdings of the appellate court on questions presented to it in reviewing proceedings of the trial court become the law of the case; those holdings conclusively settle, for purposes of that litigation, all matters ruled upon, either expressly or by necessary implication.

It is the duty of the courts to prevent abuse of process and frivolous proceedings in the administration of justice. *Waite v. Carpenter*, 3 Neb. App. 879, 533 N.W.2d 917 (1995).

6. It is clear that the Plaintiff is again attempting to relitigate issues which were previously decided against him by both the Scotts Bluff County District Court, as well as by the Nebraska Court of Appeals. Regardless of how the Plaintiff attempts to characterize his causes of action in either his original Complaint, or his Amended Complaint, it is evident that all of his underlying claims arise out of the death of Harriet I. Waite who died on April 17, 1989, and the alleged failure by Regional West to supervise the quality of care administered by its employees to the Decedent prior to her death. Those issues have been conclusively determined at the trial court level, as well as at the appellate level, against the Plaintiff. This Court is without jurisdiction to consider the claims brought by the Plaintiff against Regional West. Furthermore, any alleged actions by Leo Dobrovlny, District Judge and/or Randall Lippstreu, District Judge, were taken in their official capacity, and they are absolutely immune from suit, whether classified as a claim for damages or declaratory relief. The claims against Judges Dobrovlny and Lippstreu are further derivative in nature, in that they have no merit, if the underlying action for medical negligence is improperly brought by the Plaintiff.

The Motions to Dismiss filed both by the Defendant, Regional West, as well as by the Defendants, Leo Dobrovlny, District Judge and/or Randall Lippstreu, District Judge, are each sustained, and the Complaint filed herein on February 14, 2013, as well as the Amended Complaint filed in this action on March 21, 2013 are each dismissed with prejudice. All costs are taxed to the Plaintiff.

7. As a court of general jurisdiction, the District Court has the inherent authority to prevent the repeated filing of frivolous actions, as well as the repeated abuse of process by any litigant. In *Waite v. Carpenter*, 3 Neb. App. 879, at page 881 the Court of Appeals warned the Plaintiff about abuse of process or filing frivolous proceedings. The Court of Appeals further found in case A-07-473 that the Plaintiff's attempts to further litigate any claims that arose out of the medical care, treatment and death of Harriet I. Waite were frivolous and taken without support in fact or law and had no merit whatsoever. The Court of Appeals entered monetary sanctions against the Plaintiff and in favor of attorneys, Mark E. Novotny in the amount of \$1,072.00, and in favor of James A. Snowden in the amount of \$1,684.50.

It appears, however, that these monetary sanctions have not deterred the Plaintiff from filing the present case which this Court finds to be frivolous, and which constitutes an abuse of process. This Court will therefore take the extraordinary action of entering an Injunction permanently barring and preventing the Plaintiff, either in his personal capacity or in any representative capacity including that as of the alleged personal representative of the Estate of Harriet I. Waite, from filing any new case in any court of the State of Nebraska against any defendant, including, but not limited to, any Defendant in any of the cases set forth in paragraph 1 above. Plaintiff is further permanently barred and prevented from filing any new case against any defendant which arose either directly or indirectly out of the medical care, treatment and death of Harriet I. Waite, or any alleged damages sustained by Harriet I. Waite, or any of her children or heirs, including the Plaintiff, Glenn R. Waite.

Violation of this Injunction will subject the Plaintiff to the full contempt powers of this Court.

8. The Clerk of the District Court of Scotts Bluff County, Nebraska as well as the Clerks of the District Court of any other county in the State of Nebraska, or any county court of the State of Nebraska, shall refuse to file or docket any new case commenced by the Plaintiff, either individually or in any representative capacity, which would be in violation of paragraph 7 above.

In the event any clerk has any question whatsoever as to whether a proposed filing by the Plaintiff would violate paragraph 7 above, he or she shall prior to filing submit all documents transmitted by the Plaintiff to the undersigned District Judge for a review, and determination as to whether the documents violate paragraph 7 above. In the event the filing of said

documents would violate paragraph 7 above, said documents will be returned to the Plaintiff as unfiled.

SO ORDERED.

BY THE COURT:



DONALD E. ROWLANDS
District Judge