S-24-0144 Nathaniel J. Deckard (Appellant) v. Rosalyn Cotton, Layne Gissler, Bob Twiss, Mark Langan, and Habib Olomi, in their official capacities (Appellees)
Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County, Judge Ryan S. Post
Attorneys: Nathaniel Deckard (self-represented Appellant) and Joseph W. McKechnie and Shaianne Sunagawa, senior certified law clerk, (Nebraska Attorney General’s Office for Appellee)
Civil: Mandamus
Proceedings below: Appellant filed a verified petition for writ of mandamus in which he sought an order directing the Board of Pardons to establish a discharge date for him. The district court declined to do so. On its own motion, the Nebraska Supreme Court ordered this case to be transferred from the docket of the Nebraska Court of Appeals to its docket.
Issues: Appellant assigns the following errors: 1) The district court abused its discretion and erred in its February 13, 2024, order stating incorrectly, “As an initial matter, Relator has not alleged the Board has failed to do its duty under the law,” as the statement is refuted in the record; 2) The district court abused its discretion and erred in its February 13, 2024, order by failing to take judicial notice of a telling admission by opposing parties where Appellee actually acknowledge that Appellant’s parole and parole discharge should be treated pursuant to the 1971 statutes not the 2018 statutes. Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 27-401, 27-402, and 27-403; 3) The district court abused its discretion and erred in its February 13, 2024, order by going along with the Appellee’s wrongful interpretations of statutes in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 49-802, general rules of construction; 4) The district court abused its discretion and erred by failing to take judicial notice that lifetime parole could not be applied to Appellant’s case as no such punishment existed in Nebraska law in 1973-74 when his case was processed in the courts; and 5) The district court abused its discretion and erred by failing to ascertain the actual reason Appellees stopped using its communication authority under §§ 83-192(3) and 83-1,118(1) and (2) (Reissue 1971), relative to parole and parole discharges.