S-22‑0469, S-22-0470, and S-22-0471 Dustin L. Paxton (Appellee) v. Linda K. Paxton, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate Ronald A. Paxton; Linda K. Paxton Trustee of Ronald A. Paxton QTIP Trust; and Arlan Paxton (Appellants) (consolidated appeals)
Appeal from the District Court for McPherson County, Judge Richard A. Birch
Attorneys: Terrance O. Waite, Daniel J. Greco, and William K. Rounsbourg (Waite & Mc Wha for Appellants) and Warren R. Arganbright and Kurt Dam Arganbright (Arganbright Law Office, L.L.C. for Appellee).
Civil: Necessary and Indispensable Parties, Trusts, and Mediated Settlements
Proceedings below: Following a court-ordered mediation, the district court found the “mediated settlement memorandum” was an enforceable contract with no conditions precedent. The trial court ordered Appellants to comply with the terms set forth therein. On its own motion, the Supreme Court ordered this case to be transferred from the docket of the Court of Appeals to its docket.
Issues: Appellants make the following assignments of error: 1) The trial court erred in entertaining actions for Removal of Trustee, Trust Accounting and Recoupment of trust property without joining or causing to be joined an indispensable party: Dana Epley, Trustor’s daughter and a non-party remainder co-beneficiary; 2) The trial court erred in ordering the parties to mediate the issues of Trustee Removal, Trust Accounting and Recoupment of Trust property without joining or causing to be joined an indispensable party: i.e., Dana (Paxton) Epley, Trustor’s daughter and a non-party remainder co-beneficiary; 3) The trial court erred in treating remainder co-beneficiary Dana Epley’s trust interest as severable, i.e. in hearing Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce the Mediated Settlement Memorandum without joining or causing her to be joined as a necessary party; 4) Alternatively, if non-party co-beneficiary’s Dana Epley’s interest were properly severable within the discretion of the District Court, the trial court erred in failing to make an on-the-record finding that her trust interest was otherwise sufficiently protected for purposes of the Motion to Enforce the Mediated Settlement Memorandum; 5) Assuming, arguendo, that the Memorandum is an enforceable settlement agreement, the trial court erred in approving a settlement agreement inconsistent with a material trust purpose and without the consent of all beneficiaries; 6) Assuming, arguendo, that the Memorandum was an enforceable settlement agreement, the trial court erred in failing to consider whether the words and conduct of the parties, subsequent to the execution of the Memorandum, rendered that memorandum unenforceable; 7) The trial court erred in finding that the Memorandum contains all of the material terms; 8) The trial court erred in finding that the Memorandum is objectively an enforceable agreement; 9) The trial court erred in finding that the Memorandum is sufficiently definite in its terms so as to be enforceable; 10) The trial court erred in finding that the Memorandum does not contain as a condition precedent unanimous beneficiary consent; 11) The trial court erred in finding that the Memorandum does not contain as a condition precedent the District Court’s approval to a trust modification not inconsistent with a material trust purpose; and 12) The trial court erred in considering Plaintiff’s ex parte post-trial closing argument brief.