SUMMARY: Father’s judicial admissions through pleadings and affidavits to being natural father and juvenile court’s implicit adjudication of paternity are sufficient to preclude challenge to paternity. The child’s former guardian ad litem having joined the county attorney’s office does not disqualify the entire county attorney’s office from prosecuting the case.
William F, father to Brittany S, appealed the termination of his parental rights. The juvenile court found that termination was in the best interest of Brittany and that she was within the meaning of Neb.Rev.Stat. § 43-247(3)(a). Evidence suggested that Brittany would be placed in danger if she were under care of father and it was undisputed that child had been in out-of-home placement for over 15 months. The Court of Appeals of Nebraska affirmed termination. Father argued that state had statutory duty to exercise efforts to strengthen parent-child relationship, but had failed to provide him with opportunity to participate in rehabilitation plan. Termination of parental rights on the basis of § 43-292(7) does not require the State to provide a plan of rehabilitation. The Nebraska Supreme Court has made it clear that the requirement to provide reasonable efforts to reunify families as delineated in Neb.Rev.Stat. § 43-283.01 (Reissue 1998) is incorporated into § 43-292 only in subsection (6).
Father could not appeal on basis of state’s alleged failure to prove paternity of child, where his pleadings and affidavits constituted judicial admissions as to paternity by identifying himself as natural father of child, and juvenile court implicitly adjudicated paternity in prior proceeding. Also, father was not entitled to appointment of special prosecutor in proceeding to terminate parental rights. Father’s guardian ad litem (GAL) alleged that because child’s former GAL had obtained default judgment against father and had subsequently became employed with county attorney’s office, the office was disqualified from filing motion to terminate. The record did not refle act that child’s former GAL obtained actual money judgment against father, and even if conflict of interest existed, conflict would not be imputed on entire office, and no appearance of impropriety existed on behalf of office. Similarly, the court found that a guardian ad litem only has the power to act in the single situation for which he or she is appointed. Neither statues cited [Neb.Rev.Stat. §43-291 and §43-272.01(2)(h)] provides statutory authority for a GAL to assist those he or she represents in initiating litigation outside of the proceeding in which the GAL was appointed to represent.