In re Interest of Hailey M.

SUMMARY: “Termination of parental rights is justified if a parent has committed murder of another child of the parent; committed voluntary manslaughter of another child of the parent; aided or abetted, attempted, conspired or solicited to commit murder, or aided abetted voluntary manslaughter of the juvenile or another child of the parent.”

“Although dispositional orders of a juvenile court are final, appealable orders, if an order is not new but merely a continuation of a previous order, it does not extend the time for appeal.”

In December 1996, the State charged the defendant with one count of manslaughter and two counts of child abuse in connection with the death of her 15 month old son. Defendant plead guilty to one count of child abuse, a Class III felony. On October 29, 2005, Hailey was born to the defendant. The State removed Hailey from defendant’s care on October 30. Hailey was adjudicated as a child within the meaning of §43-247(3)(a). The State requested an order eliminating the requirement of reasonable efforts to preserve Hailey with the defendant alleging that the defendant committed the first or second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter of another child. The order was granted and the defendant’s rights were subsequently terminated. The defendant appealed the termination of her parental rights arguing that her actions in 1996 toward another child do not place Hailey at risk of harm. The Nebraska Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed the termination. The Court stated “…although a number of years have passes since [the defendant's] conviction, the fact that the standard to adjudicate is a preponderance of the evidence leads us to the conclusion that the trial court did not err in finding that Hailey is a child as defined by §43-247(3)(a). The trial court was correct in finding that [the defendant's] conduct as it related to Christopher was of such a nature to place Hailey at risk of harm.”

The Court also found that regarding the juvenile court’s denial of the biological father’s motion for visitation with the juvenile, the appeal was not timely filed, so the trial court’s actions were unaffected. The Juvenile Court denied the biological father’s first motion for visitation in January 2006, and although the father’s substantial rights were clearly affected he did not appeal from that order. The father subsequently filed a second motion for visitation which was also denied. The Nebraska Court of Appeals found that court’s second order denying the father visitation was “merely a continuation of the original order” and did not affect one of the father’s substantial rights. Thus, the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the father’s claim that the trial court erred in denying him visitation with the child.