Summary:
A mother appeals from the order of the county court for Dodge County, sitting as a juvenile court, denying her challenge to the validity of her relinquishment of parental rights to her child. Because the juvenile court denied the motion without providing the mother with a meaningful hearing, the Nebraska Supreme Court reverses, and remands for further proceedings.
Background:
Jordon B. was removed from the care of his mother, Leah B., and placed into the temporary custody of the Nebraska DHHS shortly after he was born in 2020. The juvenile court appointed Leah an attorney after Jordon was removed, and Jordon was then adjudicated as a juvenile within the meaning of the Nebraska Juvenile Code. After Jordon’s removal, he was in foster care with relatives over the next several years. Various proceedings occurred within that time that are generally not relevant to this appeal.
However, the second foster family’s challenge of Jordon’s change of placement to a third family was the subject of an appeal that led to a Supreme Court opinion in In re Interest of Jordon B. Following that opinion, Leah relinquished her parental rights to Jordon. That relinquishment is the primary subject of this appeal.
Relinquishment of Parental Rights
Leah relinquished her parental rights to Jordon on November 29, 2022, by completing and signing a DHHS form titled “Relinquishment of Child by Parent.” The relinquishment was witnessed by one person and notarized by Leah’s court-appointed attorney, who attested at the bottom of the form that Leah “executed the foregoing relinquishment and acknowledged the same to be a voluntary act and deed.” DHHS then issued Leah a “Relinquishment Acceptance Letter,” confirming that Leah had voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to Jordon on November 29, 2022, in the presence of her attorney and that all documents were explained to her by a DHHS representative. The letter stated acceptance of the relinquishment was effective from that date.
Motion for Admission of Exhibits and Termination Order
Following DHHS’ acceptance of Leah’s relinquishment, the State filed a Motion for Admission of Exhibits & Issue of Termination Order. Therein, the State alleged that Leah knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily relinquished her rights to Jordon in the presence of an attorney and that the relinquishment was delivered to DHHS. The motion further alleged that DHHS accepted responsibility for the child’s care and sent written notification of such in a letter pursuant to §43-106.01.
The State attached the relinquishment and acceptance letter to the motion and stated that due to Leah’s relinquishment by written instrument and acceptance of the relinquishment by DHHS, it was appropriate for the court to issue an Order of Termination of Parental Rights by Relinquishment. The State further requested the court to “admit the relinquishment documents as exhibits into the juvenile court record and issue the appropriate order in furtherance of the court ordered permanency goal of adoption.” The State proposed that the juvenile court take up the matter at the next scheduled hearing.
A hearing on the State’s Motion for Admission of Exhibits & Issue of Termination Order was held in April 2023, which hearing Leah and her court-appointed attorney did not attend. During the hearing, a copy of Leah’s signed relinquishment and DHHS’ acceptance of the same were offered by the State and received as evidence. Based on those exhibits, the court stated it would accept the relinquishment and enter an order accordingly terminating Leah’s rights to Jordon.
Later that day, the juvenile court entered a journal entry and order reiterating that Leah’s parental rights to Jordon were ordered relinquished. The order went on to state that the “court terminates the mother’s parental rights, pursuant to the relinquishment.” Leah’s court-appointed attorney was ordered withdrawn from the case.
Several days later, the juvenile court issued another written order, again terminating Leah’s parental rights. The order stated:
The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the mother, Leah, did voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently execute the relinquishment of her parental rights. The Court hereby accepts the relinquishment as valid, and the Court maintains jurisdiction of Jordon. The parental rights are hereby terminated between Jordon and his mother, Leah.
Motion to Rescind Termination Order
In May 2023, Leah filed a pro se “Motion to Rescind Order Terminating . . . Parental Rights.” Therein, Leah moved to rescind the termination order, generally alleging that she signed the relinquishment involuntarily and under duress and that she was developmentally disabled and should have been appointed a GAL. The juvenile court set the motion for hearing. Leah appeared pro se at that hearing. After the juvenile court addressed other matters involving the case, it turned to Leah’s motion. The court orally denied Leah’s motion, stating it would enter a written order accordingly.
The juvenile court subsequently issued a written order denying what it construed to be Leah’s motion to rescind the termination order. The order stated that “based on the record before the Court, the Court has no evidence . . . to demonstrate that Leah was under any ‘duress’ when she signed and executed her Voluntary Relinquishment.” The court further stated that Leah’s allegations of duress were directed at her and Jordon’s family members rather than the State or DHHS and that there were no allegations that the State or DHHS influenced her or placed her under any duress to sign the relinquishment. The court noted that the relinquishment Leah signed acknowledged that she did so voluntarily and that she signed the relinquishment in the presence of her attorney. The court thus found the relinquishment was in proper form and validly executed.
In addition, the court found that it could not consider Leah’s motion as a “Motion to Alter or Amend” because the motion was not filed within 10 days of the court’s order terminating her parental rights, as is required by §25-1329. Therefore, the court instead construed the motion as a Motion to Vacate the Order Terminating Leah’s Parental Rights. The court reiterated that based on the evidence, it could not find that Leah signed the relinquishment under duress and denied her motion.
The court also found that Leah lacked standing to file her motion, reasoning that because she relinquished her parental rights in November 2022, she was not a party to the action at the time she filed her motion challenging the termination order. Leah timely appealed, and the Nebraska Supreme Court moved the matter to its docket.
Assignments of Error:
Leah assigns the juvenile court erred in (1) determining that she lacked standing to file her motion challenging the validity of the relinquishment of her parental rights; (2) denying her motion on the merits; and (3) not affording her due process by (a) ruling on the motion without providing reasonable notice of the relevant hearing, (b) denying the motion without providing her with a reasonable opportunity to be heard and a meaningful evidentiary hearing, and (c) ruling on the motion without appointing her a GAL and an attorney.
Analysis:
This appeal raises issues regarding Leah’s challenge to the validity of the relinquishment of her parental rights and her opportunity to be heard on that challenge. The Supreme Court resolves those issues in Leah’s favor in the analysis below after first disposing of the State’s contention regarding jurisdiction, which parallels the juvenile court’s conclusion regarding standing.
Jurisdiction and Standing
In a juvenile case, before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it. A party must have standing before a court can exercise jurisdiction. Generally, a party has standing if it has a legal or equitable right, title, or interest in the subject matter of the controversy. Standing requires that a litigant have such a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy as to warrant invocation of a court’s jurisdiction and justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on the litigant’s behalf. In addition, for an appellate court to acquire jurisdiction of an appeal, there must be a final order or judgment entered by the court from which the appeal is taken.
Leah contends that the juvenile court erred when it determined that she lacked standing to bring her motion. The State counters that the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal because after Leah relinquished her parental rights, she was no longer Jordon’s parent, and, as a result, the juvenile court’s orders terminating her parental rights and denying her motion did not affect a substantial right. As such, the State contends that neither the order terminating her parental rights nor the order denying her motion was final and appealable. The juvenile court similarly concluded that Leah did not have standing to file her motion because after she relinquished her parental rights, she was no longer a party to the case.
The Supreme Court finds that Leah’s argument has merit, while the State’s does not. Both the claim that the Court lacks jurisdiction and that Leah lacks standing are premised on the failure to construe Leah’s motion as a motion challenging the validity of her relinquishment, rather than a motion to revoke the relinquishment or to rescind or vacate the court’s order “terminating” her parental rights. For reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Leah’s motion was a challenge to the validity of the relinquishment of her parental rights. Such determination is dispositive of the State’s argument that the Court lacks appellate jurisdiction over this appeal, as well as Leah’s assignment of error related to the juvenile court’s conclusion that she lacked standing to file her motion.
The parties do not dispute that a motion challenging the validity of a relinquishment of parental rights is distinct from a motion requesting a court to rescind or vacate an order terminating parental rights based on a validly executed relinquishment. But the State contends that the Court should treat Leah’s motion as a motion to rescind the termination order because it was titled as a “Motion to Rescind Order Terminating [Leah’s] Parental Rights” and requested that same relief in the opening line of the body of the motion. The juvenile court’s order denying Leah’s motion similarly characterized it as a “Motion to Vacate the Order Terminating her Parental Rights.” However, when the title of a filing does not reflect its substance, it is proper for a court to treat a pleading or motion based on its substance rather than its title.
As Leah asserts, her motion raised a new claim that sought relief separate and distinct from the court’s order terminating parental rights and it challenged the voluntariness of her relinquishment. Specifically, the motion alleged that Leah “signed the relinquishment documents under duress” and that Jordon’s father, grandmother, and a cousin who was Jordon’s prospective adoptive mother “all ganged up on her and threatened her if she did not sign the relinquishment papers.” The motion further alleged that the same cousin told her that if she did not sign the relinquishment, she “would never see Jordon again, no pictures, no videos, no updates.” Jordon’s father and grandmother also allegedly “threatened to kill Leah,” “verbally and physically abused her” for years, threatened to force her out of her apartment, and harassed her “constantly.”
Leah went on to allege that she was terrified of what they would do to her if she didn’t sign, and that nobody would believe her if she spoke about the threats and abuse. The motion also alleged that Leah was developmentally disabled with cognitive issues and the state team knew of her disability and took advantage of her disability by manipulating and lying to her. The motion concluded by stating she signed the relinquishment “under great duress” and feared for her safety.
It is apparent from these allegations that the body of Leah’s motion was a substantive challenge to the validity of the relinquishment of her parental rights and not a challenge to the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights. Leah alleged that she signed the relinquishment document involuntarily, under threat, coercion, duress, or some combination of the same, or that it was not signed knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. It is thus clear that Leah sought to “rescind” the termination order because the relinquishment was invalidly executed.
When the juvenile court held a hearing on the State’s motion to terminate Leah’s parental rights and then issued the subsequent order “terminating Leah’s parental rights, pursuant to the relinquishment,” the court failed to recognize the distinction between termination proceedings and relinquishment proceedings. In doing so, the court failed to heed the cautions the Court has given regarding its limited statutory authority.
Under Nebraska statutes, a voluntary relinquishment is effective upon a parent’s execution of a written instrument and DHHS’ written acceptance for the child. A valid relinquishment of parental rights is irrevocable, and a natural parent who relinquishes his or her rights to a child by a valid written instrument gives up all rights to the child at the time of the relinquishment. A parent’s knowing, intelligent, and voluntary relinquishment of a child for adoption is valid. The Court will generally uphold relinquishments absent evidence of threats, coercion, fraud, or duress. A parent’s relinquishment can only be accepted, and thus effective and irrevocable, if the relinquishment is valid. A valid relinquishment, in turn, is conditioned upon it being executed knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily, and in the absence of threats, coercion, fraud, or duress. A parent can challenge the validity of a relinquishment when those conditions have allegedly not been satisfied.
Because Leah’s motion called into question the validity and voluntariness of the relinquishment, she had standing to file the motion. Because the motion was denied, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. The Court rejects each of the State’s arguments suggesting the contrary. Even if Leah’s relinquishment was valid and her motion was not a challenge to the validity of the relinquishment, the State’s motion to terminate Leah’s parental rights would have still been unnecessary upon the validly executed relinquishment and, as such, the court’s order terminating Leah’s parental rights was needless. Any challenge to that court order would also be of no value.
Due Process Denied in Lack of Meaningful Hearing
Having determined that Leah’s motion sought to invalidate the relinquishment, the Court turns to whether she was entitled to, and afforded, due process in the proceedings related to that motion. Leah argues the juvenile court did not afford her due process when it denied her motion without providing her with a reasonable opportunity to be heard and a meaningful evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court agrees. The State’s arguments to the contrary are premised, in large part, on misconstruing Leah’s motion as a motion to rescind the order terminating her parental rights.
The U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions provide that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Due process does not guarantee an individual any particular form of state procedure. It is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. While the concept of due process defies precise definition, it embodies and requires “fundamental fairness,” and its clear central meaning is that parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard. Broadly speaking, due process requires that parties at risk of the deprivation of liberty interests be provided adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard, which are appropriate to the nature of the proceeding and the character of the rights that might be affected.
More specifically, procedural due process generally requires parties whose rights are to be affected by a proceeding to be given, at a minimum, timely notice, which is reasonably calculated to inform the person concerning the subject and issues involved in the proceeding; a reasonable opportunity to refute or defend against a charge or accusation; a reasonable opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses and present evidence on the charge or accusation; representation by counsel, when such representation is required by constitution or statute; and a hearing before an impartial decisionmaker.
Turning to the present case, it must first be determined whether Leah asserts an interest that is protected by the Due Process Clause, and if so, whether she was deprived of that interest without sufficient process. The proper starting point for legal analysis when the State involves itself in family relations is always the fundamental constitutional rights of a parent. The relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected and cannot be affected without procedural due process. The fundamental liberty interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children is afforded due process protection and is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court. Procedural due process is applicable to proceedings for the termination of parental rights. A meaningful hearing, where there was an opportunity for evidence to be presented and testimony from witnesses to be adduced, has been afforded by Nebraska courts to parents challenging the validity of their relinquishment of parental rights in numerous cases.
Because Leah’s motion alleged that she relinquished her parental rights to Jordon involuntarily, she asserted that she was deprived of her fundamental liberty interest in raising Jordon. Although the Court has made clear that the mechanisms and effects of the procedures for termination of parental rights and the procedures for relinquishment of parental rights are statutorily different and should be treated as such, the practical result of both procedures extinguishes a parent’s right to their child. Leah’s parental relationship with Jordon and her care, custody, and control of him was thus clearly affected when she signed the relinquishment of her parental rights. Because Leah’s motion sought to invalidate and void that relinquishment, she was entitled to be heard on that motion. However, the record shows that Leah was not heard in a meaningful manner, and the process she was afforded by the juvenile court was not fundamentally fair.
At the relevant hearing in this case, the juvenile court merely asked Leah if there was “anything she wanted to add” to what she said in her motion. In a single, short statement, Leah articulated concerns about the relinquishment similar to those set forth in the motion, specifically saying that she felt threatened and pressured into giving up her rights. Despite this fact, the court denied her motion, stating that “based on the record before the Court, the Court has no evidence . . . to demonstrate that Leah was under any ‘duress’ when she signed and executed her Voluntary Relinquishment.” It instead found that Leah’s relinquishment was “validly executed.”
The court denied Leah procedural due process in making such determinations without providing her with a meaningful hearing and opportunity to present evidence in support of her motion.
Remaining Assignments of Error
The Court need not address Leah’s remaining assignments of error, as her due process argument is dispositive. An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an analysis that is not necessary to adjudicate the case and controversy before it.
Conclusion:
Because Leah was not provided a meaningful hearing on her motion challenging the validity of the relinquishment of her parental rights, the Nebraska Supreme Court reverses the juvenile court’s order denying her motion and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.