SUMMARY: A juvenile court is not required to terminate jurisdiction over a minor child even though the basis for acquiring jurisdiction no longer exists.
Majority Opinion On April 25, 2005, Kevin was adjudicated under § 43-247(3)(b) for being habitually truant from school. The court ordered Kevin to “attend all scheduled classes without any truancies or tardies” and that all illnesses must be verified by a medical professional.
In November 2005, Kevin filed a motion to terminate jurisdiction. At the hearing, the DHHS case manager recommended that the “case be closed because it was a truancy case, Kevin was 16 years old, Kevin’s mother disenrolled from school on November 3, and truancy no longer applied.” The case manager concluded that DHHS could provide no further services in this matter because Kevin was no longer enrolled in school. The court ruled in favor of termination, citing that it was a parent’s “right to disenroll his or her child from school” and when they do so, “the juvenile court’s jurisdiction should terminate” when “based solely on the child’s truancy.” However, the court did note that Kevin’s best interests were “not served by terminating jurisdiction” because “Kevin has no daily program, is not enrolled in a GED program, is not employed and indeed has no significant work history whatsoever. Clearly such a situation does not bode well for his ‘development of his capacity for a healthy personality, physical well-being, and useful citizenship and to protect the public interest.’” The State appealed.
The Court of Appeals found that “Kevin’s minority status [had] not ended as a result of his mother’s discontinuing his enrollment from school. He remain[ed] a minor.” The court further stated that § 43-247 does not state that “the factual basis justifying the juvenile court’s acquisition of jurisdiction must continue to exist throughout the duration of the juvenile court’s exercise of that jurisdiction.” Therefore, “a juvenile court may continue to exercise jurisdiction over a minor child even after the basis for acquiring jurisdiction no longer exists.” The Court of Appeals also determined that terminating jurisdiction was not in the child’s best interests because Kevin’s lack of a daily program “does not bode well for his ‘development of his capacity for a healthy personality, physical well-being, and useful citizenship and to protect the public interest.’”
Dissenting Opinion In the dissenting opinion, Judge Moore stated that although Kevin’s best interests were not served by terminating jurisdiction, the language of the compulsory education statutes required that the ruling terminating the juvenile court’s jurisdiction be upheld. Under § 79-201(3)(d), if the child has reached age 16 and their parent or guardian “has signed a notarized release form discontinuing the enrollment of the child on a form provided by the school,” then the child is exempt from the compulsory education requirement. Judge Moore concluded that the requirements for the exception were satisfied by Kevin and his mother. Judge Moore further stated that the majority opinion “places a limitation” on the statute “by excluding children who are under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court,” which Judge Moore remarked is a limitation that should be made by the Legislature, not the courts. Finally, truancy was the sole basis for the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. With the executed disenrollment form, Kevin could no longer be considered truant and thus there was no basis for the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.