SUMMARY: Even though the mother was “not at fault for her present situation and that she very much desire[d] [her daughter’s] return” the court recognized that “when a parent is unable or unwilling to rehabilitate himself or herself within a reasonable time, the best interests of the child require termination of the parental rights.” In this case the mother was mildly mentally retarded and evidence presented indicated that the mother would “have these cognitive disabilities for “’probably the rest of her life[,]’” and that parenting would be “a ‘great challenge’ [and] ‘quite difficult’ without a great deal of outside help and support.”
The Court of Appeals found basis for termination. There was “no dispute that Stephanie had been in out-of-home placement continuously since May 20, 2003, which placement had lasted more than 19 months at the time the court’s termination order was filed…and more than 31 months at the time the court’s termination order was filed on January 4, 2006.” Therefore, there was “clear and convincing evidence that Stephanie had been in out-of-home placement for 15 of the most recent 22 months.”
With respect to best interests, the Court of Appeals upheld the juvenile court’s conclusion that termination was in Stephanie’s best interest. The evidence presented indicated that Stephanie’s mother is” mildly mentally retarded and will have a difficult time caring for herself, let alone Stephanie.” Also, Stephanie’s mother’s “cognitive functioning would not improve and that while [she] may be able to learn basis living skills, even this would take long-term intervention. “Finally, Stephanie was doing “very well in a home that [was] willing to provide her permanency.”
Stephanie’s mother argued that the juvenile court inappropriately “placed ‘a great deal of bearing’ on” evidence that a “’qualified family’ was interested in providing permanency for Stephanie,” in violation of § 43-292.02(2). The Court of Appeals disagreed. The statute states in relevant portion that “the fact that a qualified family for an adoption of the juvenile has been identified, recruited, processed, and approved shall have no bearing on whether parental rights shall be terminated.” The record from the juvenile court made no mention of the fact that there was a family willing to provide permanency. “Thus, the court did not specifically rely on this evidence in its termination order.” Further, even if they had relied on this evidence, the Court of Appeals determined upon their own independent review that there was sufficient evidence to support the termination of parental rights.